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This thesis seeks to increase our understanding of performance-enhancing decisions of 
company boards, with a specific focus on CEO turnovers and compensation policies 
following financial shocks. Using a self-made set of data including 830 CEO turnovers from 
726 companies from the S&P1500, the thesis includes complete analyses of effects both 
related to CEO turnovers, and the effects of providing incoming CEOs with incentive-based 
compensation early after employment. The effects from the compensation factors are firstly 
measured on the full sample using different regression techniques and time aspects. The 
effects are thereafter analyzed on two different samples. Low ownership CEOs and high 
ownership CEOs respectively. This in turn to see if the two samples are motivated differently 
to affect firm performance, and also if the low ownership CEOs are more motivated by 
receiving new equity grants than receiving other incentive-based compensation components. 
The performance of the relevant companies is measured using both accounting- and market-
based measures, in order to best explain the effects of the boards initiatives.  
Based on turnovers in 2010, I find that the EBITDA margin provides inverse relationships 
comparing pre-turnover to post-turnover performance, improving after the employment of the 
new CEO. The same relationship is found looking at the EBITDA margin for turnovers in 
2012. ROE creates sustainable growth in the years post-turnover for turnovers in 2011, while 
ROA provides general improvement for turnovers in 2009 and 2012.  I find that the fraction 
of option grants in incoming CEO compensation packages provides significant positive 
relationships to industry-adjusted ROA the following year in the sample. In other words, 
providing incoming CEOs with relatively more option grants, early after employment, seems 
to increase the return on assets for the sample companies included. I also find positive 
significant relationships between new stock grants for the CEOs and industry-adjusted price-
to-book. Focusing on the low ownership CEOs, it seems that their already existing ownership 
in the firm has a negative effect on ROA. New stock grants for the low ownership CEOs are 
however associated with positive effects on the EBITDA margin. The high ownership sample 
is recognized by having positive effects from bonus, option awards and existing ownership. 
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   1 
1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The financial crisis of 2007-2008 has led to an increased focus on corporate governance, 
principal-agency and especially the compensation structure of company CEOs. Essentially, 
the misalignments between company stockholders and the CEOs have been stated as a main 
factor triggering the crisis in the first place. As a result of this, we have seen a lot of US 
companies experiencing CEO turnovers and changing the compensation policies with regards 
to their new incoming CEOs. Have CEO turnovers made any effect on firm performance? 
Does incentive-based compensation actually have a direct impact on the performance of the 
firms? Are incoming CEOs with low ownership motivated more by being provided with new 
equity grants, compared to other incentive-based compensation elements? These are all 
questions that this thesis seeks to answer.  
Two instruments frequently used by boards facing misalignments between their manager and 
the company shareholders are the execution of CEO turnovers, and the provision of more 
incentive-based compensation as a fraction of the total CEO compensation package. There 
are however mixed opinions regarding the effects of conducting such instruments. Some 
examples show that companies have experienced positive effects related to the efforts, while 
other examples show that the efforts actually have a negative impact for the companies 
researched. Some even blame CEO bonuses and inflated compensation packages to be the 
very cause of the recent financial crisis. This thesis seeks to examine the effects of changing 
company CEOs and providing incentive-based compensation for the incoming CEOs in the 
years following the outburst of the financial crisis of 2007-2008. Using a sample of 830 
turnovers from 726 companies in the period 2009-2013 the research looks at performance of 
companies surrounding the years of the respective CEO turnovers. The post-turnover 
performance of the companies is thereby tested on CEO incentive-based compensation 
making use of different regression methodologies. This in order to see if there are any 
significant relationships between the compensation factors and the company performance. 
The sample is then split into two separate groups. One group containing high ownership 
CEOs, and the other being low ownership CEOs. This is done in order to examine whether 
low ownership CEOs are more motivated to influence firm performance by being provided 




The thesis is structured in the following manner: Section 2 represents an overview over 
relevant theoretical aspects, as well as past research used as inspiration for this thesis. Section 
3 represents the different hypotheses tested. In Section 4, I present the data connected to all 
hypotheses and the construction of the final sample. Section 5 looks at the methodology 
applied in answering the hypotheses, before Section 6 reveals the results analyses and 
answers obtained from the different tests. The conclusions can be found in Section 7, and 
finish off the thesis, before the assessment of robustness in Section 8 and suggestions for 
further research in Section 9.  
2 THEORETICAL ASPECTS 
 
I have reviewed a lot of past literature regarding effects from CEO turnovers and incentive-
based compensation on firm performance, before taking the decision of the research topics 
that this paper addresses. This chapter takes a comprehensive look at the most relevant theory 
and papers used as inspiration for the analyses of my thesis. I find theory of the firm, 
corporate governance and principal-agency as common themes among all issues that this 
paper address. This chapter therefore begins with a brief review of theory connected to these 
in Section 2.1. The chapter looks then more thoroughly at empirical articles and research that 
are directly related to firm performance surrounding CEO turnovers, before looking at effects 
of CEO incentive-based compensation on firm performance (also in relation to CEO 
turnovers). These will be found in Sections 2.2 and 2.3 respectively.  
2.1 THEORY OF THE FIRM, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND PRINCIPAL-
AGENCY 
There are a lot of different research connected to theory of the firm, corporate governance 
and principal-agency. Jensen and Meckling (1976), being one of the pioneers, provide a 
general definition of an agency relationship as “a contract under which one or more persons 
(the principals(s)) engage another person (the agent) to perform some service on their behalf” 
(Jensen & Meckling, 1976). This involves the delegation of decision making authority to the 
agent. In the case were both the principal and the agent are utility maximizers, there are good 
reasons to infer that an agent not always will behave in the best interests of the principal. 
Agency theory specifically addresses two problems that might take place. The first problem 




problem relates to the fact that (2) it is expensive or difficult for the principal to supervise 
what choices the agent is undertaking. Underlying these problems is the assumption that 
principals and their agent might not share the same risk appetite. According to Eisenhardt 
(1989), the agent and principals might prefer different actions because of their different risk 
preferences (Eisenhardt, 1989). These principal-agent problems create costs for the different 
parties involved.   
 
Jensen & Meckling (1976) further defines companies as “legal fictions which serve as a 
nexus for a set of contracting relationships among individuals” (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). 
Their definition further elaborates the companies as “sets of contracts among factors of 
production”. The theory points to shareholders of companies as principals and CEOs as 
agents. Following the definition of the organization as stated above, shareholders can be 
defined as one group of individuals and the manager(s) as another group of individual(s) 
within the firm. The relationship among them are bound between contracting relationships. 
Shareholders, as defined in most corporate governance literature, are recognized by having 
the desire to increase company value, maximizing the gains of their investments in the firm. 
They are also recognized as risk neutral (Harris & Raviv, 1979). Managers, on the other 
hand, might have personal agendas. In most literature, managers are regarded as risk averse.  
Even though managers most often can be seen doing their best job possible for the company 
and their stockholders, there are also examples of problems related to empire building and 
moral hazard. Empire building refers to the concept of managers taking actions for the 
benefit of their own career development, rather than the better good of the company. This 
could for instance be the decision of creating rapid growth in the company, rather than 
providing increased value for their shareholders. This is often done in order for the CEO to 
shine personally at short term. Moral hazard, on the other hand, refers to the concept that 
individuals will change their activities if they are not fully exposed to their consequences 
(Berk & DeMarzo, 2014). An example of this could be the encouragement by banking 
employees to perform risky lending, when they are given the assurance of bailouts by central 
banks and governments. In other words, they perform riskier activities, because they do not 
carry the full risk themselves. Looking specifically at US companies, we can see that they are 
often recognized by having relatively dispersed ownerships within their firms, compared to 
companies from other countries (Thomas & Hill, 2012). Such a dispersed ownership is 




the company CEOs. The situation of companies not having one single shareholder, or a team 
of shareholders that have the necessary number of shares to be motivated to supervise the 
managers closely (i.e. blockholders), further strengthens the possibility of principal-agency 
issues. The issues are popularly explained in literature by asymmetric information between 
the manager and the company shareholders. Asymmetric information is related to the concept 
that managers have access to more information regarding the operations of a company, 
compared to the company shareholders. The asymmetry of information tends to be bigger the 
more dispersed ownership within a firm.  
  
There are a lot of recent company scandals that have been blamed as a result of such 
principal-agency issues between company shareholders and CEOs within organizations (Berk 
& DeMarzo, 2014). One of the latest being the financial crisis of 2007-2008. Further 
examples are the Enron and WorldCom scandals also finding place in the 21st century. A 
common factor for all of these incidents are the misalignments between goals and desires of 
CEOs and other company stakeholders (especially the stockholders). The consequences 
connected to such misalignments (i.e. agency costs) between company CEOs and 
stockholders have essentially created an increased focus on the contract that governs the 
relationship between them. In many ways, research seeks to find the most efficient contract 
between stockholders and CEOs, that takes assumptions regarding “people (e.g., risk 
aversion, self-interest and bound rationality), organizations (e.g., conflict of goals among 
members) and information asymmetry into account” (Eisenhardt, 1989). Some research 
points to incentive-based compensation as a way of aligning the visions of company 
shareholders and CEOs, and thereby improving firm performance. In other words, binding 
compensation to performance, shareholders adequately provide the manager an ownership 
stake in the firm (Berk & DeMarzo, 2014). Such an incentive-based compensation contract is 
further defined as optimal contracting theory (Thomas & Hill, 2012).1 Optimal contracting 
theory suggests that the CEO contracts are formed with the purpose of maximizing 
shareholder value net of transaction and contracting costs. Such a contract will minimize the 
agency costs between the shareholders and the CEOs, and other costs that may appear as a 
result of misalignments between the two. There are different ways that can link CEO 
compensation and firm performance. One way could for instance be to base bonus on 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  According to Thomas & Hill (2012) there are two schools of theory related to US executive compensation. 




earnings growth of the company. Other ways are the additional inclusions of stock grants and 
stock options as a part of their total compensation packages. These are all incentive-based 
compensation elements that are common in modern American CEO compensation packages.  
The popularity of using the different types of incentive-based compensation elements in the 
total compensation packages of CEOs have found place at different stages in history (Thomas 
& Hill, 2012). They have also been subject to different US regulations. The 1990s were 
especially recognized by an explosion in the use of stock options. The general pay-level of 
US CEOs rose to higher levels from the mid-1980s to the 2000s. Most of this increase was 
due to the increased use of stock options by firms. There are different explanations to why the 
use of options increased during this time period. Government policy is one of the reasons 
most commonly stated. The SEC especially performed three different legislations (in 1991, 
1992 and 1993 respectively) that facilitated a greater use of stock options. 2  The first 
legislation (1991) implied that shares received by exercising options could be sold instantly 
after exercise. The second (1992) implied that American companies were only required to 
disclose the number of options granted. It was not necessary to report the whole value of the 
options. The third legislation (1993) related to the exemption of options from the $1 million 
limit of deductibility. The approval by FASB in 1995 to grant options without reporting it as 
an accounting expense further facilitated an explosion in the use of stock options.3  
Options are however not the only incentive-based compensation element that has made an 
entrance to the total compensation packages of company CEOs (Thomas & Hill, 2012). The 
use of bonus was also something that increased in the time-period of 1980s and 1990s. Later 
years have however been recognized by the shift from stock options and bonus over to 
restricted stock as the leading component of incentive-based compensation for company 
CEOs. According to Thomas & Hill (2012), the value of stock options at award date 
represented approximately 53 percent of pay of a typical CEO from S&P500 companies in 
2001. Restricted stock represented only 8 percent at that time. By 2010, as Thomas & Hill 
(2012) report, the restricted stocks accounted for 34 percent, while options had fallen to only 
represent 20 percent of the total compensation package. In other words, restricted stock 
increased by 26 percentage points, while stock options experienced a decrease of 33 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2	  SEC refers to the Securities and Exchange Commission of the United States. SEC is an independent agency 
that have the responsibility to administer the federal securities law.	  
3 FASB refers to the Financial Accounting Standards Board, which is responsible for the standards of financial 




percentage points during these nine years. These changes have also been connected to 
changes in US legislation and government policy. Other explanations for the shift in the 
compensation structure in the early 21st century refers to the stock market crash connected to 
the internet bubble in 2000, and the 9/11 terrorist-attack of 2001 (also affecting the stock 
market). Thomas & Hill (2012) reports that the use of stock options tends to decline when 
markets trend downwards (i.e. bear markets). 
In addition to adjusting the compensation structure of a CEO, CEO turnovers work as more 
direct instruments in order to align shareholder and manager interests, as well as improving 
company performance. In cases were turnovers prove to be forced, it might be because of a 
loose of faith from the shareholders and boards of a company with regards to their manager. 
Performing a turnover might result in finding a candidate that turns out to be a better fit. A 
turnover, however, does not necessarily have to be caused of forced reasons from a 
company’s part. Vancil (1987) argues that 60 percent of CEOs decide to retire at the 
contractual time, and that 80-90 percent leave or retire under expected conditions (Vancil, 
1987).  A voluntary turnover might also provide effect on company performance that was not 
initially expected. Research connected to both CEO turnovers and CEO compensation, and 
their influence on firm performance, will be discussed in the following two chapters.  
	  
2.2 RESEARCH RELATED TO CEO TURNOVERS AND THEIR EFFECTS ON FIRM 
PERFORMANCE  
The departure of a CEO is something that can be voluntarily, either because of CEO 
retirements or CEOs simply changing jobs.  However, some cases show that CEOs are forced 
out due to different reasons. An incoming CEO can be internally hired, or externally hired. 
Some turnovers are performed as a result of poor performance for the industry as a whole, 
while others are performed because of internal conflicts within a company. Some are caused 
by company mergers. As we can see, there are a lot of different ways to analyze CEO 
turnovers and their effects on company performance. This chapter takes a comprehensive 
look at the main research used as inspiration and guidance for the first issue that the thesis 
addresses.  
In their paper from 1995, Denis & Denis have documented that forced departures of outgoing 
CEOs are preceded by large and significant drop in operating performance, however followed 




turnovers are followed by small increases in operating income, as well as downsizing in the 
operations of the firms. The main argument is that if the internal control mechanisms of the 
companies are effective, there should be (i) a greater frequency of top management turnovers 
in poorly performing firms and (ii) improvements in firm performance following 
management changes. This falls in line with other research papers addressing the same topic. 
Coughlan & Schmidt (1985) and Warner et al. (1988) both find that the rate at which the top 
executives change is inversely correlated to prior stock price performance. Coughlan & 
Schmidt (1985) specifically looks at the hypothesis that both compensation changes and 
changes in management are ways to control top executives, and that the appliance of these 
control mechanisms is motivated by fluctuations in the firm’s stock performance. Using a set 
of data from 1977-1980 they document that the boards of the firms in general creates 
managerial incentives which is in line with those of the owners of the firm, both with regards 
to the setting of compensation and decisions related to the position of the CEO. Warner et al. 
(1988) provide more accurately evidence on the inverse relationship between a firm’s stock 
price performance and CEO turnover. Using a probit model they seek to see if monitoring of 
the board of directors, mutual monitoring among managers and monitoring by blockholders 
can create a negative relationship between top management change and share performance. 
Jenter & Kanaan (2015) takes a thorough look at CEO turnovers and the fact that CEOs are 
fired after bad firm performance caused by factors that are beyond their control (Jenter & 
Kanaan, 2015). The study looks at 3365 CEO turnovers in the period from 1993 to 2009, and 
discover that the CEOs are more likely to be fired from their jobs in the period after bad peer 
performance, to a greater degree than after bad market performance. They argue that this can 
be explained in three parts: First, the managers might be optimally rewarded or punished for 
peer group results if the manager’s choices affect the peer performance itself. Second, CEOs 
might be dismissed as a result of bad peer performance if the board receives more 
information about their CEOs in such times. Thirdly, the frequency of turnovers might be 
caused by bad firm performance if the board not behaves optimally and misattribute 
performance components from industry to the CEO. Huson et al. (2004) further complements 
the other research papers by finding deteriorating firm performance prior to turnover and 
increasing performance post-turnover. Their research uses the accounting-based measures of 
operating income to book assets (OROA) and operating income to sales (OROS) as 
performance margins of interest, both unadjusted and industry-adjusted. The data span a 




1971 to 1994.   
 
2.3 RESEARCH RELATED TO CEO INCENTIVE-BASED COMPENSATION AND 
THEIR EFFECTS ON FIRM PERFORMANCE  
“A way to make managers act in the interests of the owners of the company, is to actually 
make the managers owners of the company. This can be done through the compensation 
policy of the firm” (Berk & DeMarzo, 2014). More specifically, tying compensation to firm 
performance, the shareholders adequately give the manager an ownership stake in the 
company. This chapter looks more closely at research connecting CEO compensation to 
company performance. 
In his article on corporate performance and managerial remuneration, Murphy (1985) tries to 
examine the relationships between firm performance and managerial pay. The research 
makes us of a sample of five hundred executives from 73 of the largest US manufacturing 
firms in the time-span 1964-1981. Contradictory to other research, Murphy (1985) omits the 
executives’ large quantities of stock and stock options. He rather focuses on the cash 
remuneration that the executives receive in the simultaneous year as the company 
performance. Using stockholders return as performance measure he finds evidence on 
pronounced positive effect of performance on compensation. He finds specifically that 
Salary, Bonus, Salary + Bonus and deferred compensation all provide positive significant 
relationships to firm performance.  
Jensen & Murphy (1990) argues that equity-based compensation instead of cash 
compensation should provide managers with a better incentive to maximize firm value. Their 
discussion is based on the fact that the compensation policy of the firm can create value-
increasing incentives for the CEOs. More specifically, they look at performance effects of 
bonuses, salary revisions, stock options and other performance-based compensation factors 
such as stock ownership. Their paper, based on performance pay and top-management 
incentives for 2000 CEOs, finds that the largest CEO performance incentives comes from 
their already existing ownership of the firm’s stock. They further find that even though 
bonuses account for approximately 50 percent of CEO salary in their sample, they are 
awarded in ways that do not make a significant effect on firm performance. Mehran (1995) 
argues too that incentive-based compensation elements should have a greater impact on 




experiencing turnovers from 1979-1980, he tests if the structure of the compensation (rather 
than the level) can provide better results for the relevant companies of research. His research 
differs from that of Jensen & Murphy (1990) in the way that he looks at compensation in the 
context of the ownership structure of the firm, and the composition of its board of directors. 
He further includes both small and large firms in the sample tested. The relevant findings of 
Mehran (1995) is that the percentage of executive compensation that is equity-based is 
inversely connected to their percentage of equity holdings. He further finds that firm 
performance has a positive relation to the percentage of CEO compensation that is equity-
based, and that firm performance is positively related to the percentage of equity held by 
managers, which confirms the stated suggestions of principal-agent theory.  
Blackwell et. al. (2007) builds on some of the ideas of Mehran (1995) and Jensen & Murphy 
(1990). Blackwell et. al. focus on changes in CEO compensation structure and the impact on 
future firm performance following CEO turnovers (Blackwell, et al., 2007). Their research, 
using a sample of 100-121 turnovers from 1981-1992, reveals that incoming CEOs receive 
significantly greater percentage of their compensation from option grants and new stock 
grants than outgoing CEOs. They further find that post-turnover positive performance can be 
related to new stock grants as a percentage of total compensation both in cases of forced and 
voluntary turnovers (when analyzed separately). They argue that new stock grants have a 
greater effect on the incoming CEO relative to the outgoing. A possible drawback of this 
research is however the fact that incoming and outgoing CEOs are in different stages of their 
employment in the comparison being made. This will make the comparison of equity 
compensation somewhat skewed, as one often sees that CEO´s receive more equity based 
compensation early in the period of employment.  
 
2.4 KEY TAKEAWAYS 
All the above-mentioned papers have affected the choice of research that my thesis relies on. 
From reading the articles in Sections 2.2 and 2.3, I was inspired to look more thoroughly at 
firm performance surrounding CEO turnovers, as well as incentive-based compensation 
effects. Especially, Denis & Denis (1995) motivated me to look at changes in performance 
for companies changing their CEO. Huson et al. (2004) influenced me into looking at 
different performance measures, not only looking at stock returns. Jensen & Murphy (1990), 
Mehran (1995) and Blackwell et al. (2007) have been especially inspiring with regards to 




papers have in the end provided the motivation to dig deeper into theory of corporate 
governance and principal-agency first presented in the chapter. Below follows an overview of 
the most important research papers review, providing information on the performance 






Author(s) Performance Measures Industry Adjusted N (Turnovers) Period Sources of Data
CEO Turnovers and their Effect on Company Performance
Denis & Denis (1995) Stock Returns, OROA Yes 908 1985-1988 Wall Street Journal, Standard and Poor's
Coughlan & Schmidt (1985) Stock Returns - 140 1977-1980 Forbes, CRSP
Warner, Watts and Wruck (1988) Stock Returns Yes 567 1963-1978 Wall Street Journal, Standard and Poor's
Weisbach (1988) Stock Returns, EBIT Yes 286 1974-1983 Forbes, NYSE, CRSP
Jenter & Kanaan (2015) Stock Returns Yes 3365 1993-2009 WRDS, Compustat, Execucomp
Huson et al. (2004) OROA, OROS Yes 1344 1971-1994 Forbes, Moody's, Proxy Statements
CEO Incentive-Based Compensation and their Effects on Company Performance 
Murphy (1985) Stock Returns Yes - 1964-1981 Proxy Statements, CRSP 
Jensen & Murphy (1990) Shareholder Wealth - - 1974-1986 Forbes, Compustat, CRSP
Mehran (1995) Tobins Q, ROA Yes 153 1979-1980 Compustat, Proxy Statements, Moody's Annual
Blackwell et al. (2007) Tobins Q, ROA, OIBDA Yes 125 1982-1991 Forbes, Compustat, Wall Street Journal
Table 1 provides an overview over the most relevant research articles reviewed as inspiration for my thesis. The overview provides 
information on the different performance measures that they have used, as well as number of turnovers (if relevant) and sample time-
period. I provide additionally some of the sources that they have used. As seen from the overview, the oldest data sample used was 
1963-1978 by Warner, Watts and Wruck (1988). The most recent is Jenter and Kanaan (2015) using a sample from 1993-2009. The 
articles of Blackwell (2007) and Mehran (1995) were especially important for the choices of data sources and methodology that I 
use. Data related to this figure have been found by reading the articles. I have made the figure using Microsoft Excel. 






In this section I develop my hypotheses tested in the thesis, as mentioned in Chapter 1. From 
the research reviewed in the prior section, we have seen that CEO turnovers are often 
recognized by having inverse company results, when comparing pre- and post-turnover. 
Inverse in the meaning that the performance usually deteriorates to some extent before 
turnover, before they increase in the aftermath of the turnover. Since the period of research 
for my data looks at the years directly following the outburst of the financial crisis of 2007-
2008, the results might differ from the ones seen in the prior research. The downturn of the 
American economy post-crisis has been partly softened as a result of fiscal stimulus 
(Davidson, 2013). It is however also recognized by continuing high debt-levels and slow 
recovery. An article from USA Today from 2013 confirms this when saying: “the aftershocks 
of the historic upheaval are still being felt in nearly every corner of the economy” and “it is 
the slowest growth in the economy since World War 2” (Davidson, 2013). It might be that 
the effects of changing CEO during the years of 2009-2013 not actually leads to sustainable 
improvements for the sample companies, post-turnover. The first hypothesis of the thesis is 
therefore stated as follows: 
HYPOTHESIS 1: FIRM PERFORMANCE FOLLOWING CEO TURNOVERS IN THE PERIOD  2009-
2013 DOES NOT PROVIDE SUSTAINABLE IMPROVEMENTS FOR THE SAMPLE COMPANIES 
 
 
We learned in the theoretical aspects part of the thesis that a solution to principal-agent 
conflicts between a manager and company shareholders is to apply incentive-based 
compensation in the total compensation packages of the company CEOs. This in order to 
align the visions and goals of the shareholders and the managers of the firms. Popular 
incentive-based compensation factors used by modern companies are bonus, new equities and 
stock options among others. The use of incentive-based compensation is specifically 
something that emerged during 80’s the 90’s, as a result of legislation moving towards self-
regulation, as we saw in the theoretical aspects part (Thomas & Hill, 2012). The 1990’s was 
recognized by an explosion of stock options, while the early 2000’s have been recognized by 
an increased use of restricted stock. Jensen & Murphy (1990), Blackwell et al. (2007) and 
Mehran (2005) all conducted empirical analyses studying the effects of different incentive-




explanatory variables tested. I believe that these relationships should also hold in the years 
following the outburst of the financial crisis. Such a time period should lead to companies 
striving to align the visions of their shareholders and their manager to an even greater extent. 
The second hypotheses therefore states:  
 
HYPOTHESIS 2: INCENTIVE-BASED COMPENSATION IN INCOMING CEO COMPENSATION-
PACKAGE PROVIDE SIGNIFICANT EFFECTS ON POST TURNOVER PERFORMANCE 
 
One of the sub-hypotheses included in the research of Mehran (2005), was that boards 
effectively provide low ownership CEOs with more new equity grants early after 
employment, relative to the already high ownership CEOs of the sample firms. The last 
hypothesis of my thesis is also based on a splitting of the sample CEOs. One group of high 
ownership incoming CEOs and one group of low ownership incoming CEOs, following 
Mehran (2005). I specifically want to test if incoming CEOs that own less than 5% of the 
company shares, are more motivated to affect firm performance by being provided with more 
new equity. In other words, to see if correlation between performance and additional equity 
appears to provide robust significance. I will also see if the high ownership CEOs are more 
motivated to affect firm performance by other incentive-based compensation factors. A 
comparison to high ownership CEOs will therefore be conducted continuously. The third 
hypothesis states:  
HYPOTHESIS 3: LOW OWNERSHIP INCOMING CEOS ARE MORE MOTIVATED BY BEING 
GRANTED NEW EQUITY, COMPARED TO OTHER INCENTIVE-BASED COMPENSATION 
FACTORS  
 
All hypotheses are presented in their own respective parts under the methodology and results 
parts of the paper. The statistical soundness of the results connected to the empirical analyses 
of the second hypothesis has been tested in order to give the best possible conclusions to the 






4 DATA  
 
This section provides an overview of the data connected to the different analyses performed. 
Section 4.1 illustrates the sources of the data collected and the construction of the final 
dataset. Section 4.2 provides an overview over the choices of market and event window used. 
Section 4.3 describes the sample selection criteria of the sample turnovers, while Section 4.4 
takes a closer look at company performance measures, which are used in answering all three 
hypotheses stated. Section 4.5 looks deeper at compensation and firm level data mostly 
relevant for the second and third hypotheses of the thesis. The different characteristics 
provided are based on the choices of independent- and control variables for the regressions 
analyses under the Methodology Part (Chapter 5) of the thesis. In the end Section 5 of this 
chapter contains a brief discussion regarding soundness of the data. 
 
4.1 SOURCES OF DATA AND CONSTRUCTION OF THE FINAL SAMPLE  
This thesis looks at a sample of 830 CEO turnovers originating from 726 companies from the 
S&P1500 in the timespan between 2009-2013. The S&P1500 is a stock market index 
produced by Standard & Poor’s, including approximately 90% of the market capitalization of 
US stocks (S&P Dow Jones Indices, 2017). I have collected all data personally in order to 
construct the final dynamic dataset that is compatible for use in Stata. Stata is the program 
that I have used to produce the statistical regressions and summary statistics of the thesis. I 
have downloaded as good as all data from Wharton Research Data Services (hereafter 
WRDS). WRDS is an award-winning platform covering a great amount of data on 
companies, including financial-, compensation- and employment details (WRDS, 2017). The 
data which covers firm characteristics, CEO characteristics and CEO compensation have all 
been collected from the Compustat Executive Compensation of WRDS. The Compustat 
Executive Compensation platform was the one that initially helped me find the turnovers by 
collecting data on the incoming CEOs such as Date Became CEO within the timeframe 2009-
2013. The first download contained CEO characteristics such as Date Became CEO, Date 
Joined Company, Date Left as CEO, Date Left Company, Current Age, CEO Name etc. This 
information became the foundation for my dataset, which I constructed in the first weeks of 
the research. The foundation, which included the incoming CEOs and their companies, 




based on years relative to the start year of the incoming CEOs (T0). This means, in turn, that 
the actual years differ dependent on the start year (within the timeframe 2009-2013) of the 
incoming CEO for the companies. Each observation of CEO turnover has initially been 
provided with eleven years of observations (five years prior- and post-turnover including 
transition year) in the original dataset. A CEO which was employed in 2011 would therefore 
have the framework of observations from year 2006 to 2016. After finding the CEOs and the 
relevant companies that were involved in turnovers from WRDS, I had to individually look 
up the Global Company Keys (hereafter GVKEYs) for each and every company on the 
Company Lookup Platform of WRDS. The GVKEYs are six digits codes that WRDS uses to 
recognize the firms, in order to provide data for the user. The system does not recognize the 
firms if the GVKEY contains the slightest deviation from its correct value. In other words, 
this required structured and thorough work (especially since the total sample consists of 726 
firm observations). Financial numbers from company statements and balance sheets were 
then individually downloaded using Compustat Financials of WRDS. These have been used 
to calculate most of the performance margins for all analyses, as well as providing 
information of the control variables for the regression analyses. These were implemented into 
the dataset using Excel techniques, matching GVKEYs and respective years of the 
observations.  It is important to notice that the availability of the different data collected from 
WRDS differ. This means that some years connected to the CEOs and companies have 
missing data with regards to compensation and firm financials respectively. Stata effectively 
screens out observations that does not contain the number of data necessary to perform the 
tests. This facilitates fewer observations in the regression models, then the number of 
turnovers initially structured in the dataset.  
Two of the performance margins (Total Q and price-to-book presented in Section 4.4) and the 
relevant industry margins are obtained from the Financial Ratios Suite by WRDS. These are 
pre-calculated ratios delivered on a monthly basis. I have calculated these to provide yearly 
numbers respectively, after the collection. This in order to match the rest of the dataset. I 
have also received a pre-made overview of data from Dirk Jenter (associate professor of 
finance at London School of Economics), covering forced and unforced turnovers for the 




using press reports and age criteria.4 Dirk Jenter was contacted by E-mail and he sent an 
updated Excel sheet in return, indicating the turnovers that were forced. The overview builds 
on the one used in his research together with Fabi Kanaan (CEO Turnover and Relative 
Performance Evaluation). The Excel sheet contained a column indicating 1 if a turnover was 
forced and 0 if the turnover was voluntary. I received the E-mail containing the forced 
turnovers on September 25, 2017. The relevant companies covering the forced turnovers 
were provided with GVKEYs such that I was able to match the turnovers with the ones that I 
had retrieved from WRDS. I have additionally done a robustness-check by looking them up 
on the internet. The sample containing 830 CEO turnovers from 726 companies indicates an 
annual CEO turnover rate of 22.87%, which is slightly higher than those of Denis & Denis 
(1995) and Weisbach (1988).5 This can come as a cause of choosing the time period directly 
following the financial crisis. The sample numbers also indicate that there are 52 companies 
experiencing two turnovers.  
4.2 CHOICE OF MARKET AND EVENT WINDOW 	  	  
The choice to use turnovers and companies from America has mostly been made for 
statistical reasons. My impression is that data available on CEO and company information are 
a lot bigger in size, and more accessible for the American market, than other similar markets. 
I wanted to have access to as many observations, and as accurate information as possible, in 
order to get the most robust results from the research as possible. The American market was 
also the one first affected by the outburst of the financial crisis. I find additionally the 
American companies more appealing with regards to compensation structures and ownership 
policies, than other markets. According to Thomas and Hill (2012) American companies use 
more incentives such as equities and options compared to companies from other countries 
(Thomas & Hill, 2012). The choice to use the timeframe between 2009-2013 has been made 
as I have yet to find any other similar research from the same period. These are also the most 
recent years following the outburst of the financial crisis. Performance ratios were only 
provided up until 2015, and this is the reason why I choose to stop at 2013 for the turnovers. 
A lot of research examines time periods in which there have not been any great business 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4	  The press reports indicating departures as fired or forced out due to differences in opinions or pressure are 
defined as forced (Jenter & Kanaan, 2015). CEOs with age equal to or above 60 are classified as voluntary. All 
others below 60 have been classified based on reasons of health conditions or the acceptance of other positions. 
Their paper can be found in the bibliography under: “CEO Turnover and Relative Performance Evaluation”. 
5 This measure is calculated by dividing the total number of management changes on the total number of firm 
years (726 firms times 5 years), following Denis & Denis (1995). Denis & Denis (1995) and Weisbach (1988) 




shocks. Using data following the financial crisis may capture other effects, then those 
previously observed.  The raw hand-constructed set of data covers five years before the 
turnover to five years after the turnover, including the transition year (a total of eleven years 
per observation) as previously mentioned. After narrowing down the issues of research in the 
paper, hypothesis one looks at the timeframe of one year prior to turnover (T0-1), the 
transition-year (T0) and three years after (T0+1), (T0+2) and (T0+3) respectively. This to 
best capture the changes in performance surrounding the CEO turnovers, and capturing the 
effects of implementing the new CEO with different compensation elements. The second and 
third hypotheses are analyzed using industry-adjusted performance measures from year two 
(T0+2) and three (T0+3) post-turnover and explanatory variables (compensation-, firm level- 
and turnover data) from year one (T0+1) and two (T0+2) post-turnover respectively. Hence, 
the relevant number of years per observations in the final sample make up a total of five 
years. The timelines connected to answering the different hypotheses can be found in 
methodology Sections 5.1, 5.2 and 5.3 respectively. 
4.3 SAMPLE SELECTION CRITERIA AND STATISTICS FOR SAMPLE TURNOVERS 
Ending up with the final sample of 830 turnovers from 726 companies has required a lot of 
considerations, and a set of exclusions from the sample of data initially constructed. From the 
total sample of turnovers initially downloaded, I have excluded approximately 50 turnovers 
as a result of CEOs being employed for less than one year. These are so called interim CEOs 
that are presupposed to have had too short amount of time in the office in order to make a real 
impact on the company results. Such CEOs are often temporarily hired in the position, while 
waiting for a new employment of a CEO.  
The final sample of data consists of 773 males and 57 females as newly hired CEOs. These 
have been classified as dummies with 1 being male and 0 being female respectively. The 
appointments have been defined as forced or unforced following Parrino (1997) as previously 
mentioned. This is the most common used procedure of classifying turnovers as forced, and 
makes use of press reports in addition to age criterions in its classification. Forced turnovers 
have been given value 1, while voluntary turnovers have been provided with a 0. The 
incoming CEOs are further classified as either internally or externally hired. From WRDS, I 
have been able to obtain data on the time period from when the CEOs joined the company 
(Date Joined Company), and when the CEOs actually became CEO (Date Became CEO). 




been classified as internally hired. All else have been classified as externally hired. External 
hires have been classified with 1, while internal hires have been classified with 0 in the 
dataset.  
The retentions of the CEOs have been provided with notation 1 if the CEO has remained in 
the company after his or her duty as CEO. Any position other than the position as CEO as last 
position held in company (Most Recent Title), has been characterized with this notation. The 
cases where I have been provided with the information that the CEO has left the position as 
CEO, and CEO was his or her last position in the company, have been classified with a 0. 
Information on Date Became CEO and Date Left as CEO has given me the opportunity to 
calculate CEO tenure at the company. In the cases where the CEO is still sitting as CEO, 
Date Became CEO has been subtracted from 2017 using the Yearfrac command in Excel.  
Table 2 on the next page provide us with an overview over the descriptive statistics from the 
final sample. From this we learn that the number of voluntary turnovers largely outplay the 
forced ones. A mean value of the departure-dummy of 0.05 provide us with that conclusion. 
This is slightly lower than those of Denis & Denis (1995), who obtained 7% forced turnovers 
in their sample. We see that incoming CEOs have an average age of 51 when taking on the 
position, with a minimum age of 30 and highest age of 88.6 The average CEO has one year in 
the company before becoming CEO. The highest observation in this regard is 56 years in the 
company before becoming CEO. Average tenure is five years in the seat. We can see that the 
CEOs have an average ownership in their firm of 1%, and that most of the hired CEOs are 
externally hired. The high amount of external hires contradicts those of Denis & Denis (1995) 
who reports that 65 percent were internal hires in their paper. A total of 31% of the CEOs 





	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6	  Timothy S. Ho serves as the youngest employed CEO, when he became CEO of Enova International Inc. in 
2011 at an age of 30. David H. Murdock of Dole Food Co Inc. represents the oldest when taking the position as 





4.4 COMPANY PERFORMANCE RATIOS 	  
The company performance ratios are used in answering all three hypotheses, and are 
therefore critical for the results of the research. The different performance ratios provided in 
the sample have been chosen with the purpose of covering the most important profitability 
measures for the relevant stakeholders of the sample companies. This has entitled the use of 
both accounting- and market aspects of the company performance. There is a continuing 
debate in literature regarding which proxies of firm performance that are the correct ones to 
use (Mehran, 1995). Some research argues that stock returns are the best way to measure firm 
performance. However, it has been proved that this mostly accounts for all-equity firms. An 
argument for using accounting-based returns is their high importance in the determination of 
executive compensation (Murphy & Jensen, 1990). Mehran (1995) and Hermalin and 
Weisbach (1998) argue additionally in their research that accounting-based and market-based 
performance measures are better than stock returns, with regards to capturing effects of CEO 
turnovers. It is argued that especially accounting-based returns give boards information 
regarding the value added to the firm by the new CEO. This thesis looks specifically at 
Descriptive statistics of sample turnovers from 2009-2013 and the complementary CEO characteristics for the successor 
CEO. Forced turnovers follow Parrino (1997). CEO age at turnover is calculated by subtracting (2017-Start Year of CEO) 
from Present Age. Years at company before CEO position is calculated by subtracting Date Became CEO from Date Joined 
Company. Tenure as CEO is further calculated by subtracting Date Left as CEO from Date Became CEO. In the cases 
where Date Left as CEO is absent, 2017 is used instead. Internal CEOs are calculated by observing Date Joined Company 
and Date became CEO. Outsiders are defined as those who have not had a position in company prior to taking the seat as 
CEO. CEO retention is defined as 1 if the CEOs have position as Chairman after their position as CEO. All data have been 
downloaded from WRDS. I have calculated the Statistics by codes in Stata. The table is made by using Microsoft Excel.  
TABLE 2: OVERVIEW OF TURNOVER CHARACTERISTICS 
Characteristics Mean Median Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum Observations
Turnover Characteristics 
Forced (Forced=1, Voluntary=0) 0.05 0 0.22 0 1 830
Incoming CEO Characteristicts
CEO Age at Turnover 51 51 6.62 30 88 830
Years at Company Before CEO Position 1 0 5.24 0 56 830
Tenure as CEO 5 5 1.72 2 7 830
Outsider (External = 1, Internal = 0) 0.89 1 0.32 0 1 830
CEO Retention (Chairman=1, Out=0) 0.31 0 0.46 0 1 830
Share Ownership 1.00% 0.20% 4.06% 0% 33% 399




companies with a wide range of different debt-to-equity levels, and falls otherwise also in 
line with the samples of Mehran (1995) and Hermalin and Weisbach (1998). Accounting-
based and market-based measures are in other words chosen. A description of the 
performance measures and their calculations is provided in the subsection below. 
 
4.4.1 ACCOUNTING-BASED PERFORMANCE RATIOS 
•   RETURN ON EQUITY 
The return on equity (ROE) measures the respective company earnings over their total equity 
(Berk & DeMarzo, 2014). This profitability measure provides the reader with information on 
how much earnings a company generates with the money that the respective shareholders 
have invested in the firm. The higher the ROE, the higher the earnings growth generated from 
investments. The performance measure used in this thesis has been calculated for all sample 
firms by dividing the company earnings on their total equity in Excel. The earnings and total 






ROE can further be decomposed into what is called the DuPont formula, which can be 











The DuPont formula divides the performance measure into three parts, and helps explain the 
changes in ROE over time (Berk & DeMarzo, 2014). The three different parts include net 
profit margin, asset turnover and the financial leverage respectively. In this way, we can see 
that an increase or decrease in ROE can be caused by different characteristics of the firms’ 
financials.  
•   RETURN ON ASSETS 
The EBIT return on assets (ROA) has additionally been chosen in order to look at the 
company operating profitability relative to its total assets (Berk & DeMarzo, 2014). EBIT is 
short for earnings before interest and taxes. The measurement provides the viewer with 




obligations such as interest and taxes are paid by the companies. It is therefore a good 
measure for organizations to use when wanting to compare the relationship between its 
resources and income. A higher ROA indicates higher EBIT returns to total assets. The ratio 
has been calculated in the dataset by dividing company EBIT on their total assets. Both 





where EBIT = Net income + Interest Expense + Taxes. 
•   EBITDA MARGIN 
The EBTIDA margin has been included in order to get a measure of the company operating 
profitability as a percentage of its total revenue (Berk & DeMarzo, 2014). This measure 
provides the reader with information on how much operating-cash that is generated for every 
dollar of revenue earned in the company. This was calculated in Excel by dividing the 
EBITDA for the sample companies on their respective revenues (for all years). Using 
measures prior to the deduction of tax, depreciation and amortization is an advantage as these 
are factors that do not belong to the company’s core business making process. These factors 
may be biased because of employee considerations. Accounting-based measures will always 
have the possibility of being manipulated, for example by accruals (Denis & Denis, 1995). A 
departing CEO might for instance be motivated to increase the reported earnings in order to 
try and save their job. An incoming CEO might have incentives to reduce the reported 
earnings (“big bath”) shortly after their employment in order to blame their predecessors and 
claim credit for the following success.7 In addition to avoiding the above-mentioned issues, 
the use of EBITDA returns facilitates a solid comparison of different companies of different 
sizes, with different debt-to-equity structures and origination from different industries. The 
formula for the EBITDA margin can be illustrated as follows:  
 





	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Using net income instead of EBITDA might cause troubles related to “big bath”. A lot of “baths” implicate 




4.4.2 MARKET-BASED PERFORMANCE RATIOS 
Total Q (Tobin’s Q) and Price-to-Book (P/B) have been included in order to get market-
based measures of the company’s performance following Mehran (1995) and Blackwell et al. 
(2007) and others.  
•   Q-RATIO 
The Total Q ratio is the WRDS version of Tobin’s Q, that includes intangible capital in the 
denominator (Peters & Taylor, 2016). Corporate finance literature has over the years been 
recognized by often using Tobin’s Q as a proxy for a firm’s investment opportunities. 
Tobin’s Q is defined as initially by James Tobin of Yale University (Tobin & Brainard, 
1977). He predicted that the market value of the total capital of all companies on the stock 
market should be similar to their respective replacement cost. The following frameworks 
were therefore set forward:  
Q Ratio= 
Total Market Value of Firm
Total Asset Value	  of	  firm  
Or similarly, 
Q Ratio=	  
Market Value of Installed Capital
Replacement Cost of Capital
 
The idea is that if the market-value completely represents the recorded value of the assets of 
the company, the Tobins Q should be equal to one. If the Tobins Q turns out to be higher than 
one, the market value surpasses the actual value of the company’s assets. This means that the 
market captures some unmeasured or unrecorded assets of the firm. In many cases, this could 
encourage firms to invest more in capital, as they are worth more than the price paid for 
them. The company in the case of a Tobin’s Q above one is characterized as overvalued by 
the market. Similarly, a Tobin’s Q ratio between zero and one suggests that the market values 
the firm assets as less than their recorded value. In this case, the companies are characterized 
as undervalued. Tobin’s Q focus to some extent on the firm’s physical assets, as opposed to 
intangible assets. Peters & Taylor (2016) suggests that intangible assets should be included in 
the ratio initially set forward by Tobin. This in order to create an even better proxy for 
investment opportunities of the companies. The Total Q ratio represents otherwise the same 





•   PRICE-TO-BOOK RATIO  
The price-to-book ratio is the second market-based performance measure included in the 
analyses. The ratio is used to compare a stocks market value to its book value, and can be 




Market Price Per Share
Book Value Per Share
 
 
A low P/B ratio will similarly to a low Total Q ratio mean that the company is undervalued 
by the market, while a high value reflects that the equity is overvalued by the market (Berk & 
DeMarzo, 2014). The reason that the market value of equity might be higher or lower than 
the book value, comes from the fact that the market value is a forward-looking measure, 
driven by market consensus and future cash flows of the company. The book value of equity 
is accounting-based, and follows specific accounting rules (i.e. historic cost). The measure 
reflects earlier issuance of equity affected by profit or losses, dividends and share buybacks. 
The price-to-book ratio has been frequently used by investors in order to look at a company’s 
growth opportunities. A general rule is that investors should be cautious in the case of large 
divergence between a company’s ROE and price-to-nook (Berk & DeMarzo, 2014). 
Overvalued growth stocks are often characterized by low ROE and high price-to-book ratios 
simultaneously. A growing ROE for a company should be followed by a growing P/B ratio. It 
is important to reflect upon the fact that the price-to-book ratio is mostly useful when looking 
at capital-intensive companies, or financial businesses with plenty of assets on the books. 
Because of conservative accounting rules, the book value of the ratio usually ignores 
intangible assets like brand name, patents and goodwill set in place by the company. In this 
way, the book value doesn’t provide as much information about the companies that are highly 
focused on intangible assets, such as for example Microsoft. 
Most of the ratios mentioned above have been calculated from raw financial data downloaded 
from WRDS. Total Q and price-to-book ratios were downloaded as pre-made ratios on a 
monthly basis. The database did not have any data on ratios after 2015, and that is the reason 
to why later years have not been retrieved. The respective Fama 48 industry medians for the 
same time period have also been downloaded. The industry medians have been matched with 
their relevant years and company industries in order to adjust the performance measures. This 




comparison is often used in relative performance evaluation in order to evaluate 
compensation contracts or threats of turnover. The developments of the different industry-
adjusted performance measures for the sample companies can be found in Section 6.1.  
 
4.5 COMPENSATION AND FIRM LEVEL DATA	   
4.5.1 DISTRIBUTION OF COMPENSATION FOR THE INCOMING CEOS 
I have included the following compensation factors in order to best answer the second and 
third hypotheses of the paper: salary, bonus, new stock grants, option grants, non-equity 
incentive plan compensation and all other compensation. These were all collected from 
WRDS Execucomp database as previously mentioned in Section 4.1. WRDS defines salary 
as the dollar value of the base salary of the (cash and non-cash) which is earned by the CEO 
during the fiscal year (WRDS, 2017). The values are measured in thousands of dollars, when 
initially collecting them from WRDS. Bonus refers to the dollar value of bonus (cash and 
non-cash) that is earned by the CEO during the fiscal year. The units are provided in 
thousands of dollars similarly to salary when downloading from the database. Equity grants 
are defined as stock related awards (e.g. restricted stock, restricted stock units, phantom 
stock, phantom stock units, common stock equivalent units etc.) that does not have option-
like features. The valuation that WRDS makes is based on the values of shares that vested 
during the year, as specified by FAS123R.8 The amount provided by WRDS is the cost that is 
recorded by the company on its income statement or balance sheet for the fiscal year. Option 
grants are defined as option-related awards (e.g. options, stock appreciation rights and other 
instruments with option-like features). The valuation is in a similar manner to equity grants 
based on the value of vested options during the year according to FAS123R. The amount 
provided by WRDS is the cost that is recorded by the company on its income statement or 
balance sheet for the fiscal year. Non-equity incentives plan refers to incentives other than 
those offered by stock grants and option grants. The amount belongs to the year that the 
compensation was earned. All other compensation includes perks such as personal benefits, 
life-insurance premiums, awards under charitable awards programs and discounted share 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8	  FAS123R refers to the financial accounting standard introduced by the Financial Accounting Standards Board 
that requires companies to subtract the amount of share-based (equity) payment as well as options granted to 




purchases etc. The latter category is also measured in thousands of dollars when downloading 
the data form WRDS. 
The different compensation elements are all divided by total compensation for the CEO, 
following Blackwell et al. (2007). This in order to better illustrate the differences in size of 
the compensation elements. This is also a way to control for systematic differences in the 
level of pay as a result of differences in firm size (Blackwell, et al., 2007). I have made a 
thorough comparison of the distribution of the different compensation elements for the CEOs 
to that of Payscale, especially looking at cash compensation as a fraction of total 
compensation (PayScale, 2017). 9  Payscale is one of the world’s largest databases on 
individual salary profiles, and is thereby a solid source for robustness checks in this manner. 
A comparison is also made to those stated by Thomas & Hill (2012). Data regarding the total 
percentage ownership of company stock for CEO are also considered in order to capture 
effects from the level of ownership in year one and two following employment for the 
respective incoming CEOs. It makes sense to assume that not only value of new stock awards 
provides incentives for CEO, but also the fraction of already total existing ownership that the 
CEOs have. The third hypothesis specifically compares shareholders with different 
ownership-level in the company.10  
Observing Table 3, we can see that new stock grants for the incoming CEOs make up the 
largest share of their total compensation package on average (looking at the full sample). 
Specifically, we see that the fraction of new stock grants provides a mean value of 33.73%, 
which relates well to the fraction of stocks as presented by Thomas & Hill (2012), mentioned 
in the theoretical aspects Section 2.1. Salary, being the second highest element provides a 
mean value of 23.93% as a share of total compensation. Option grants make up 13.51%, 
while bonus make up only 3.22%. From these numbers, we learn that companies to a higher 
extent provide their CEOs with equity-based compensation rather than bonus, when it comes 
to incentive-based compensation for the period 2009-2013. This might come as a result of 
unwanted negative effects specifically related to bonus prior to the financial crisis. Top 
executive bonus is, after all, a component which has been blamed to cause higher risk-taking 
by company executives before the outburst of the financial crisis. This, in addition to the 
promise of bailouts from government and central banks. I have added a total incentives 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Payscale is one of the world’s largest databases on individual salary profiles using crowdsourcing and big data 
technologies. For more information see www.payscale.com 




category in Table 2 below. This illustrates the sum of new stock grants, bonus and option 
grants. These components make up over 50% of the total compensation, which supports 
Thomas & Hill (2012) further. Comparing high ownership CEOs to low ownership CEOs, we 
can see that high ownership CEOs are provided with relatively higher fractions of salary and 
bonus, compared to the low ownership CEOs on average. The low ownership CEOs are 
however provided with higher fractions of new stock grants and option grants as incentive-
based compensation factors. This is something that complements one of the findings of 
Mehran (1995) who hypothesized that boards will use more new equity-based compensation 





























TABLE 3: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF INCOMING CEO COMPENSATION 
Table 3 above illustrates the composition of the different compensation factors of the sample CEOs. The 
numbers are specified to look at the mean values from year two and three post-turnover for the sample. From this 
we learn that new stock grants make up the largest fraction when observing the full sample of CEOs. High 
ownership CEOs are granted relatively more salary and bonus, while low ownership CEOs are granted with 
relatively more incentives. (a) Equality of means test statistics (student t) is conducted in order to provide a 
comparison between high ownership CEOs and the low ownership CEOs. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10. All 
data are retrieved from WRDS. I have calculated the statistics by codes in Stata. Table is produced in Excel. 




Minimum (%) SD (%) Equality of Means Test 
Statistic a
Salary
   All Incoming CEOs 23.93 17.83 100 0 19.36
   High Ownership CEOs 32.97 32.46 100 0 26.96 7.3178 (0.000)***
   Low Ownership CEOs 22.48 25.71 100 0 17.42
Bonus
  All Incoming CEOs 3.22 0 79.39 0 9.83
  High Ownership CEOs 5.15 0 76.49 0 13.60 3.0407 (0.0024)***
  Low Ownership CEOs 2.91 0 79.39 0 9.05
New Stock Grants
  All Incoming CEOs 33.73 32.98 100 0 24.27
  High Ownership CEOs 25.57 20.45 100 0 25.57 6.3217 (0.0000)***
  Low Ownership CEOs 35.24 34.9 100 0 23.52
Option Grants
  All Incoming CEOs 13.51 5.88 96.78 0 17.43
  High Ownership  CEOs 13.03 0 94.14 0 20.62 0.4228 (0.6725)
  Low Ownership CEOs 13.59 8.01 96.78 0 16.87
(Total Incentives)
  All Incoming CEOs 51.58 56.14 100 0 25.27
  High Ownership CEOs 43.37 49.74 100 0 30.26 5.0365 (0.0000)***
  Low Ownership CEOs 52.89 36.35 100 0 24.13
Non Equity-Incentive Based
All Incoming CEOs 19.25 18.16 93.35 0 16.16
High Ownership CEOs 16.36 11.45 93.35 0 18.61 2.7557,(0.0059)***
Low Ownership CEOs 19.71 18.89 91.59 0 15.69
All Other Compensation
All Incoming CEOs 5.25 1.69 58.63 0 13.13
High Ownership CEOs 7.29 1.66 85.14 0 13.73 2.4025 (0.0164)**
Low Ownership CEOs 4.92 1.71 100 0 12.64




4.5.2 FIRM LEVEL DATA 
I have thoroughly sorted the sample companies into their respective industry, based on the 
Fama 48 classification system, following Jenter and Kanaan (2015).11 The Fama 48 system 
has also been chosen in order to be able to match the firms with their respective industry 
medians on firm performance measures, collected from WRDS. The industry medians of 
performance margins were provided by their respective Fama industries, while the companies 
originally were sorted by SIC codes when collecting financial fundamentals. In order to be 
able to match the two by Excel techniques, the FAMA classification was chosen.   
 
Figure 1 on the next page provides an overview over the sectors containing firms that 
experience most turnovers between 2009-2013.12 The graph is designed in such a way that it 
shows the number of companies in the specific sectors that experience turnovers, as well as 
the distributions of firm size. Firm size is here based on the total market capitalization of the 
companies. Companies having a mean market cap higher than or equal to $10 billion over the 
span of their respective time-series are categorized as Large Cap Companies. Example of 
such companies in the sample are Apple Inc., General Motors CO. and Accenture PLC. Small 
Cap Companies are defined as those with a total market cap less than $2 billion. Examples of 
such companies are Stein Mart Inc., Cognex Corp. and Panera Bread CO. The Medium Cap 
companies are the ones with market cap between $2 billion and $10 billion. Here we find 
companies such as Alaska Air Group Inc., FMC Corp. and First Solar Inc. Specifically, we 
can see that most of the turnovers have found place in companies belonging to the business 
services category. A total of 113 companies experiencing turnovers in the time period of 
2009-2013 belong to this specific sector. I find that there are 62 companies defined as small 
cap, 34 defined as medium cap and only 17 large cap companies. Business services is one of 
the widest defined groups in the Fama 48 classification system, ranging from management 
consulting services to industrial launderers. We can further see that retail, banking, as well as 
petroleum and gas services are sectors that have experienced a lot of turnovers in the period 
of measurement. From the industries illustrated, we can observe that most of the large 
companies experiencing turnovers belong to banking, followed by business services and 
petroleum and gas. Healthcare services, electronic equipment and machinery are 
characterized by containing relatively higher share of small-cap companies.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 See Appendix Part A3 for full overview of FAMA 48 industries. 
12 There are more sectors having turnovers, however only the nine experiencing the most turnovers are included 





Available financial data for the companies included in the sample have additionally been 
downloaded and implemented in the dataset, as previously mentioned. All regressions 
conducted in answering hypothesis two and three use combinations of these as control 
variables, which are presented in Section 5.2.4, Table 4. These include the use of total assets, 
R&D expenditures, total revenue, long-term debt, capital expenditures and acquisitions. 
These are financials that WRDS provides in dollar millions when initially downloading. Total 
assets refer to the total amount of assets as reported on the companies’ balance sheets 
(WRDS, 2017). R&D expenditures count for the research and development expenses for the 
relevant companies. Total revenue refers to the company’s total sales during the respective 
financial years. Long-term debt is defined by WRDS as long-term obligations, loans on 
insurance policies, bonds, mortgages and similar debt among others (WRDS, 2017). Capital 
expenditures refers to capital that are used for additions to property, plant and equipment and 
similar purchases. Acquisitions investments such as additional ownership in companies and 
company goodwill. 
FIGURE 1: OVERVIEW OF TURNOVERS CATEGORIZED BY FIRM SECTORS 
Figure 1: An overview of the nine Fama French sectors experiencing the most turnovers of the sample. From this we learn 
that business services account for the highest share, representing 113 turnovers.  Retail represents 85, while banking and oil 
represents 73 and 54 respectively. The data originates from WRDS. I have calculated the statistics by codes in Stata, while 




4.6 DISCUSSIONS REGARDING DATA SOUNDNESS 
4.6.1 DATA OUTLIERS	   	   
The sample contains companies from different sectors, with different sizes and in different 
stages of their lifecycles. This in turn will lead to some deviating observations from the mean 
with regards to company financials. One example could be the difference of companies from 
asset-intensive industries compared to companies from other industries with respect to ROA. 
Having more assets could cause lower values in this margin. Examples of such industries are 
Commercial Real Estate, Mining and Raw Materials as well as Oil and Gas. Another example 
could be that younger companies might focus more on growth, compared to already 
established companies. This could cause accounting-based margins (with focus on operating 
profitability) to be unnatural high in periods, compared to the sample average. The consensus 
of the market can from time to time influence the marked-based ratios. The decision to keep 
or remove outliers in a sample is largely discussed in econometrics (Woolridge, 2006). 
Outliers are something that might affect regression results when present, however to a larger 
extent when included in small sample sizes. The greatest problem is in the event that outliers 
are caused because of entering a number wrongly in the dataset. This is something that will 
cause incorrect regression results. This is however not the case for the sample companies that 
this thesis relies on. All performance variables have been calculated using formulas in Excel 
in the same manner, and can therefore not be subject to any typing mistakes. In fact, I have 
included a large span of different firms in the dataset to provide the variety necessary in 
conducting statistical tests. The decision of not removing all deviating values has therefore 
been made.  
4.6.2 WHARTON RESEARCH DATA SERVICES 
Another aspect that might affect the soundness of the sample data, is the use of WRDS as 
data source. Firstly, the database restricts users that does not pay for full membership, 
meaning that full access has not been available. This in turn means that data regarding firm 
corporate governance, which could have been relevant for the research have not been 
available for collection. Second, WRDS operates with different platforms on the different 
data services offered. Some of the different platforms available utilize however different 
characteristics for the companies when collecting the data. This means that matching the data, 
has led to a lot of work with regards to matching relevant years and relevant industry 




much data, and as precise, as WRDS does. Having used the first part of the research-period 
on screening sources of data, WRDS was by far the best with respect to the topics that this 





















5.1 METHODOLOGY RELATED TO RELATIVE PERFORMANCE EVALUATION 
(HYPOTHESIS ONE) 
The methodology connected to relative performance evaluation of the sample companies, is 
specified to compare the industry-adjusted performance measures from the year prior to 
turnover (T0-1) to the transition year (T0) and the three years following turnovers in the 
sample (T0+1), (T0+2) and (T0+3). Denis & Denis (1995), Coughlan & Schmidt (1985) and 
Warner et al. (1988) all argued that the performance of the companies should have somewhat 
inverse relationships from prior- to post-turnover, with post-turnover representing 
improvement in the performance for the companies tested. My hypothesis states that the 
improvement is not necessarily sustainable for the research sample post-turnover, because of 
effects connected to the financial crisis. The methodology connected to hypothesis one is 
therefore to do a thorough analysis of the changes of the relevant industry-adjusted 
performance measures of the companies individually. 13  Improvements in the industry-
adjusted performance measures are here defined as having increased mean values. This can 
be measured on a year to year basis, or for the period as a whole. The timeline below 
provides an overview of the time-aspects of answering the first hypothesis. 
 




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 See Section 6.1 for analyses 
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5.2 METHODOLOGY RELATED TO EMPIRICAL ANALYSES OF COMPENSATION 
EFFECTS ON RELATIVE PERFORMANCE (HYPOTHESIS TWO) 
5.2.1 REGRESSION METHODOLOGIES AND TIME ISSUES 
In order to best measure the effects from incoming CEOs incentive-based compensation on 
firm performance, there needs to be time-lag between the dependent variables and 
explanatory variables used in the tests. This in turn because effects of initiatives on company 
performance tend to take at least a year before they can be observed. The methodology 
related to the regressions below therefore looks at effects on performance measures from year 
two and three after turnover, by using independent variables lagged one year (except from the 
dummy-variables) and two years respectively. There are in total five types of regression 
analyses tested, each testing all five performance-measures as dependent variables. These can 
be presented in the following manner: 
(1) OLS Model 1: The first regression methodology uses robust ordinary least squares 
regression (hereafter OLS) looking at performance measures from year two (T0+2) after 
turnover, regressed by independent- and control variables (explanatory variables) from year 
one (T0+1) after turnover. This in order to see if there are any correlation between the 
incentive-based compensation factors that the new CEO receives in his or her first year of 
employment, on the performance of the company in year two. The relationship between 
dependent and independent variables in the regression model can be illustrated as follows:  
FIGURE 3: TIMELINE CONNECTED TO OLS MODEL 1 
 
(2) OLS Model 2: The second type of regression analyses applies OLS analyzing industry-
adjusted performance measures from year three (T0+3) after turnover regressed by 
explanatory variables from year two (T0+2) after turnover. In other words, testing if there are 
any effects of incentive-based compensation for the new CEO in his or her second year of 
employment on industry-adjusted performance for the company in year three after turnover. 
Remember, all CEOs included are in office for at least two years. They are therefore all 









provided with compensation in year two after turnover as well. The relationship between 
dependent and independent variables can be illustrated as the following:  
FIGURE 4: TIMELINE CONNECTED TO OLS MODEL 2 
 
(3) OLS Model 3: The third regression uses OLS looking at industry-adjusted performance 
measures from year three (T0+3) after turnover regressed on explanatory variables from year 
one (T0+1) after turnover. Hence, the regression provides a two-year lag, in order to see if the 
compensation and firm-level data from year one after turnover make an impact on the 
performance three years post turnover. The regression can be illustrated as follows:  
FIGURE 5: TIMELINE CONNECTED TO OLS MODEL 3 
 
 
The use of OLS regressions follows Jensen & Murphy (1990), Blackwell et al. (2007) and 
Mehran (1995) among other research papers on compensation policy.  
Regression number three and four uses random effects- and fixed effects models respectively, 






















and three simultaneously, while using explanatory variables lagged by one year. 14 The time-
line can be illustrated as follows:  
FIGURE 6: TIMELINE CONNECTED TO FIXED EFFECTS AND RANDOM EFFECTS MODEL 
 
 
All five above-mentioned regressions follow the stated regression-equation below, varying 
the industry-adjusted performance measures.15  
  
IAPM16  =  b0 + b1*(% New Stock Grants) +  b2* (% Option Grants) + b3* (% Bonus) + 
b4*(% Stock Owned by CEO) + bi*(Control Variables) + U 
U|X ∼ N (0,s2)17 
 
b0 = Constant value (intercept) of the regression. This is the average value of the dependent 
variable, and is the value that the dependent variable will have if all other coefficients are 
equal to zero.  
bI = Regression coefficient of the independent variables and control variables. Determines 
how much the average value of the dependent variable will change, by one units change in 
the independent- or control variable.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 The regression seeks to see effects of independent variables lagged one year on performance in year two and 
three (grouped) in the same regression. Measuring dependent variables over two years provides us with a times-
series, and following panel data analysis. This entitles the use of fixed effects and random effects models.  
15 For more information regarding different regression methodologies, see Section 5.4. 
16 IAPM = Industry-adjusted performance measure. That is, Total Q, ROE, ROA, EBITDA Margin or price-to-
book margin.	  

















U = The error term of the model. This is a residual variable that catches the variation in the 
dependent variable that the independent and control variables are not able to explain.  
The analyses will be conducted by firstly observing all five regressions collectively to see if 
there are any relationships between compensation factors and performance measures that are 
similar with respect to signs and significance. Such a finding would strengthen the possibility 
of a solid relationship, and is therefore an important aspect. The methodology will then 
secondly take an individual look at all regressions, with a focus on specific characteristics for 
each and every regression model.  
5.2.2 DEPENDENT VARIABLES 
The industry-adjusted performance measures Total Q (Tobins Q) and ROA are included as 
dependent variables, following Blackwell et. al. (2007) and Mehran (1995). EBITDA margin, 
ROE and price-to-book ratio have been included as well in order to get a comprehensive 
measure of operating profitability for the companies, the return on equity and to get a 
complementary market-based measure to that of Total Q. Contradictory to Denis & Denis 
(1995) and Blackwell et al. (2007) I focus only on the industry-adjusted measures of 
performance margins. After testing for both, I find little or no particular difference in the 
effects. I find the adjusted measures more informative as they look at the company results 
relative to peer companies. This provides information on abnormal returns for the sample 
companies. According to Holmström (1982), using relative performance (by industry) to base 
compensation for CEOs provide them incentives to increase shareholder wealth, while at the 
same time eliminating the risk-increasing effects of industrywide and marketwide factors that 
the executives cannot control (Holmstrom, 1982). This is something that additionally argues 
in the direction of using relative performance evaluation.  
5.2.3 INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
The independent compensation variables used in the regression analyses are the percentage of 
new stock grants to total compensation (New Stock Grants (%)), percentage of option grants 
to total compensation (Option Grants (%)) and percentage rate of bonus to total 
compensation (Bonus (%)). These can all be found under independent variables in Table 4 in 
Section 5.2.4 below. Other compensation factors such as salary, non-equity based 
compensation and all other compensation factors are all dropped from the analyses as they 
are not presupposed to fall into the category of incentive-based compensation that this thesis 




variables, following Blackwell et al. (2007). The last independent variable is the total fraction 
of existing share ownership for the company CEOs (Stock Owned by CEO (%)). The existing 
ownerships of the CEOs as a fraction of total company ownership is not a variable that falls 
under the total compensation category, but is included as an individual variable in order to 
see if the existing ownership is something that also could motivate managers to affect 
performance. This is additionally the variable relevant for sorting CEOs into high ownership 
and low ownership, answering the third hypothesis of the thesis. All independent variables 
are lagged by one year compared to the dependent variables in all regression analyses 
conducted. 
 
5.2.4 CONTROL VARIABLES 
One of the relationships that is most commonly documented in the executive compensation 
literature is the positive interaction between executive compensation and the size of the 
company. Providing higher compensation for management in larger companies might be 
needed as the position often requires the handling of more demanding and complex tasks. 
This is essentially an issue that needs to be accounted for when analyzing firm performance. 
A lot of previous research account for firm size by using the natural logarithm of firm total 
assets (E.g., Mehran (1995), Blackwell et al. (2007) & Murphy (1985)). I choose also to use 
the natural logarithm of total assets, consistent with previous literature.  
Previous studies seem also to use firm growth opportunities when explaining firm 
performance. Some studies use Tobins Q as a measure for growth opportunities, while others 
use assets in place as the ratio of inventory.18  Most commonly however is the use of R&D to 
sales. Since this research focus on Tobins Q (Total Q) as a performance measure, R&D to 
sales has been chosen as a proxy for firm growth opportunities, following Mehran (1995). 
R&D to sales measures the percentage of revenue that is effectively allocated to R&D 
expenditures. In addition to being a proxy for firm growth opportunities, R&D/Sales also 
serve as a proxy for managerial discretion and information asymmetry (Hirschey, et al., 
2012).19   
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 Blackwell et al. (2007) use both assets in place as a ratio of inventory, and gross plant and equipment to total 
assets (Blackwell, et al., 2007).  
19 According to Hirschey et al. (2012) 24% of all papers published in the Journal of Finance, the Journal of 





Following Blackwell et al. (2007) and Mehran (1995) long-term debt to total assets is used as 
an independent variable in the regression analyses. Studies on executive compensation-
effects have previously used long-term debt to total assets as a variable because of its relation 
to agency costs of debt, which again might affect firm performance (Blackwell, et al., 2007).  
Effects regarding the departure of old CEO and the arrival of new CEO are included in the 
analyses as dummy-variables. The recruiting-dummy takes the value of 1 if the incoming 
CEO is recruited externally, while 0 if recruited internally. The dummy is included in order to 
possibly capture effects of CEO affiliation. The departure-dummy equals to 1 if the old CEO 
was fired, and 0 if the old CEO resigned voluntarily. This follows Blackwell et al. (2007) and 
Denis & Denis (1995) among others. An age dummy has been included in order to account 
for possible horizon problems of the incoming CEO (Blackwell, et al., 2007). CEOs older 
than 60 years might prefer cash compensation rather than equity and options due to their 
shorter employment horizon. Underlying the horizon hypothesis is the fact that CEOs close to 
retirement age often choose to avoid valuable capital investment expenditures because their 
incentive plans based on accounting principles will penalize them, and further reward only 
the successor. This must be accounted for. The age-dummy takes values of 1 if the CEO is of 
60 years and older. If the CEO is younger than 60 years, the dummy takes value of 0. A 
gender-dummy is additionally included to measure any possible effects of differences in 
performance as a result of the CEO gender. The gender-dummy takes value 1 if the CEO is a 
male, while it takes value 0 if CEO is female.  
Capital expenditures divided by total assets and acquisitions/total assets are also included in 
order to adjust for the effects of these. It might be questioned if it is necessary to include 
acquisitions as a variable. I find however no difference in coefficients signs and only small 
changes in regression coefficients when including the variable. Hence, the variable is 
included in order to reduce the risk of omitted variable bias. Both variables are divided by 
total assets in order to differ on differences in size of the firms. All non-dummy independent 
variables in the regression are as mentioned lagged by one year. An overview over the 
different regression variables discussed and their statistics for the relevant years of 






TABLE 4: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF REGRESSION VARIABLES 
Total Q = Market value of assets divided by book value of asses. Industry-adjusted.  
ROE = Return on equity. Calculated by dividing company earnings by total equity. Industry-adjusted.  
ROA = Return on assets. Calculated by dividing company EBIT by total assets of the firm. Industry-adjusted.  
EBITDA Margin = Earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization divided by total assets of the firm. I-A 
Price-to-Book ratio. Market value of equity / book value of equity. Industry-adjusted.  
T0+1 = one year post-turnover. T0+2 = two years post turnover. T0+3 Three years post-turnover.  
New Stock Grants (%) = The value of new stock grants for the new CEO. Divided by total compensation.  
Option Grants (%) = Value of option grants divided by total compensation for the CEO.   
Bonus (%) = Value of bonus divided by total compensation.   
Stock Owned by CEO (%) = Percentage value of total CEO ownership in company.  
Ln (Total Assets) Natural logarithm of total assets of the companies. Proxy for firm size.  
R&D/Sales = Firm R&D expenditures divided by total sales of the firm. Proxy for firm growth opportunities.  
LT-Debt/Total assets = Long term debt of companies divided by their respective total assets. Proxy for agency cost of debt. 
Departure-Dummy = Takes value of 1 if outgoing CEO was fired, 0 if he/she left voluntarily.  
Recruiting-Dummy (1=external, 0 internal) = Dummy variable providing information about internal and external recruiting. 
Age-Dummy = Takes value 1 if CEO is male and 0 if CEO is female . 
CapEx/Total Assets = Capital expenditures of the companies divided by their total assets .  
Acquisitions/Total Assets = Acquisitions of the companies divided by their total assets.  
	   	  
	   	  
Variables Mean Median Maximum Minimum Std. Dev Observations
Dependent Variables
Industry-Adjusted Performance Measures
ROE (T0 +2) -0.08 0.02 5.17 -50.17 2.00 750
ROE (T0 +3) 0.09 0.20 20.58 -4.49 1.10 533
ROA (T0 +2) 0.02 0.00 0.93 -1.02 0.13 825
ROA (T0 +3) 0.02 0.00 0.93 -1.02 0.13 533
EBITDA Margin (T0 +2) -0.40 0.02 1.74 -2.33 0.27 825
EBITDA Margin  (T0 +3) 0.06 0.02 1.71 -2.00 0.29 588
Total Q  (T0 +2) 0.93 -0.02 85.97 -33.12 8.32 292
Total Q  (T0 +3) 1.03 -0.15 96.86 -32.15 1.03 182
Price-to-Book (T0+2) 0.73 0.00 28.87 -6.23 3.44 641
Price-to-Book (T0+3) 0.94 0.01 35.23 -6.50 4.03 477
Independent (Explanatory) Variables
New Stock Grants (%) (T0+1) 0.33 0.32 1.00 0.00 0.24 753
New Stock Grants (%) (T0+2) 0.37 0.37 1.00 0.00 0.24 723
Option Grants (%) (T0+1) 0.14 0.08 0.94 0.00 0.18 753
Option Grants (%) (T0+2) 0.13 0.00 0.97 0.00 0.17 723
Bonus (%) (T0+1) 0.04 0.00 0.79 0.00 0.10 753
Bonus (%) (T0+2) 0.03 0.00 0.75 0.00 0.09 723
Stock Owned by CEO (%) (T0+1) 0.01 0.00 0.39 0.00 0.03 702
Stock Owned by CEO (%) (T0+2) 0.01 0.00 0.31 0.00 0.23 661
Ln (Total Assets)  (T0+1) 7.99 7.95 14.57 1.27 1.85 819
Ln (Total Assets) (T0+2) 8.08 8.08 14.61 1.28 1.83 790
R&D/Sales (T0+1) 0.03 0.00 3.36 0.00 0.16 779
R&D/Sales (T0+2) 0.04 0.00 4.38 0.00 0.20 753
LT-Debt/Total Assets (T0+1) 0.23 0.19 3.02 0.00 0.24 779
LT-Debt/Total Assets (T0+2) 0.25 0.21 3.21 0.00 0.24 753
Departure-Dummy (T0+2) 0.05 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.22 830
Departure-Dummy (T0+3) 0.05 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.22 830
Recruiting-Dummy (T0+2) 0.89 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.32 830
Recruiting-Dummy (T0+3) 0.89 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.32 830
Age-Dummy (T0+2) 0.16 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.37 830
Age-Dummy (T0+3) 0.19 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.40 830
Gender-Dummy (T0+2) 0.94 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.24 830
Gender-Dummy (T0+3) 0.94 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.24 830
CapEx/Total Assets (T0+1) 0.04 0.03 0.33 0.00 0.05 779
CapEx/Total Assets (T0+2) 0.04 0.03 0.34 0.00 0.05 753
Acquisitions/Total Assets (T0+1) 0.02 0.00 0.78 0.00 0.07 779




5.3 METHODOLOGY RELATED TO COMPENSATION-EFFECTS ON RELATIVE 
PERFORMANCE – LOW VS HIGH OWNERSHIP CEOS (HYPOTHESIS THREE) 
The methodology related to hypothesis three of the thesis follows the same pattern as the 
methodology for hypothesis two as previously presented. The only difference is that I now 
divide the sample incoming CEOs into one sample being low ownership CEOs and one 
sample being high ownership CEOs. The regression methodology restricts to looking at the 
three OLS models described in the previous section (not the fixed effects and random 
effects). A low ownership CEO is as previously mentioned defined as having ownership 
lower than or equal to 5% in the company. A high ownership CEO is defined as having 
ownership higher than or equal to 5% in the company. The comparison is done in order to see 
if CEOs with lower ownership in the firm are more motivated by new equity incentives rather 
than other incentive-based compensation factors. The analysis is structured to first look at the 
low ownership sample, before taking a more thorough look at the high ownership sample. 
The results of the regressions from the last hypothesis can be found in Section 6.3 below. 
5.4 CHARACTERISTICS OF THE DIFFERENT REGRESSION METHODOLOGIES 
5.4.1 ORDINARY LEAST SQUARES MODEL 
The OLS models in the regressions of the thesis are included as the model in econometrics is 
regarded as the best linear unbiased estimator (BLUE) when analysing cross-sectional data 
(Woolridge, 2006). Cross-Sectional data refers to the fact that the dataset includes units that 
appear from the same point in time. This is exactly the case in the first three regressions of 
hypothesis one and two in the case of this thesis. In those regressions, we saw that the 
industry-adjusted performance measures originated from year two after turnover, and year 
three after turnover regressed individually. In other words, they originate from only one year 
in the time series. The same can be said with regards to the explanatory variables, only that 
they appeared from one year or two years prior to the dependent variable respectively. The 
OLS model, initially seeks to find the best way that a dependent variable can be explained by 
independent variables. This facilitates the search for fitted coefficient estimators which 
minimizes the sum of squared of the errors. The OLS model rest on several assumptions in 







5.4.2 RANDOM EFFECTS MODEL AND FIXED EFFECTS MODEL 
The random effects and fixed effects models are popularly used when working with time-
series and panel data analysis (Woolridge, 2006). Time-series data refers to the data set 
containing variables that are drawn from different points in time. As we saw in the third and 
fourth regressions connected to hypotheses one, the dependent variables included industry-
adjusted performance-measures originating from both year two and three after turnover. This 
make up a time-series of two years of observations, with regards to the explanatory variables. 
The reason that OLS is not preferred when dealing with time-series is because economic 
observations rarely can be seen as independent across time. Panel data essentially means that 
we have time-series for every cross-sectional variable in the set of data. In my case, this was 
every observation of CEO turnover (company) experiencing two years of performance 
measures. fixed effects models are based on the concern of having unobserved effects (a) in 
the model that might be correlated with explanatory variables. In this way, it wants to get rid 
of these unobserved effects, in order to avoid bias. Random effects model, on the other hand, 
allows these fixed effects. It assumes that the effects are not correlated with explanatory 
variables. In econometrics, it is stated that the Random Effects Model is more efficient than 
Fixed Effects if the assumption of no correlation holds.  
6 RESULTS 
	  
6.1 RESULTS OF RELATIVE FIRM PERFORMANCE FOLLOWING CEO TURNOVERS 
2009-2013 (HYPOTHESIS 1) 
Table 5-10 and Figures 7-12 provide an overview over the different developments in the 
mean values of the industry-adjusted performance measures included in the analyses. All 
measures count for companies experiencing turnovers in the period 2009-2013. The tables 
and figures show the development from the year prior to turnover (T0-1) of the CEO, the 
transition year (T0), and the following three years (T0+1), (T0+2) and (T0+3) respectively. As 
a result of lacking data on the margins after 2015, the turnovers from 2013 are measured up 
to and including 2015.20 
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




6.1.1 THE BIG PICTURE: OBSERVING PERFORMANCE SURROUNDING ALL CEO TURNOVER-
YEARS 
Observing Table 5 and Figure 7 below we can see that performance surrounding all CEO 
turnovers fluctuate to a large extent, looking away from ROA. ROA show high consistency, 
being 0.02 for all years. This means essentially that the sample companies provide higher 
returns to their assets for the whole period compared to peer companies. The industry-
adjusted ROE follows Denis & Denis (1995), Coughlan & Schmidt (1985) and Warner et al. 
(1988) to some extent, as it 
decreases prior to turnover, 
and then increases the first 
year after turnover. We see 
however that the margin drops 
between year one and year 
two post-turnover, before 
increasing in the last year of 
measurement. The EBITDA 
Margin follows the same 
pattern as the ROE margin, 
going from reduced value, to 
increased value, to reduced 
value yet again. These two 
margins show great instability 
in the years of measurement, 
supporting the first hypothesis 
of the thesis. Moving over to 
the market-based performance measures, we see that Total Q show somewhat stable increase 
throughout the whole period of measurement, only being slightly reduced between year one 
and two after turnover. It seems as the sample companies are valued higher by the market, 
compared to their peer groups. However, to less extent from year to year. This could result 
from the market having high expectations because of turnover, however adjusting the 
expectations down after the implementation. The price-to-book ratio shows on the other hand 
steady decrease the first four years of measurement, before increasing between year two and 







































Years Relative to Turnover 
Industry-Adjusted Performance Measures for 
Turnovers 2009-2013 
ROE EBITDA Margin ROA Total Q Price/Book 
Years ROE ROA
EBITDA 
Margin Total Q Price/Book
T0-1 0.13 0.02 0.00 0.22 1.25
T0 0.00 0.02 -0.01 0.69 1.10
T0+1 0.06 0.02 0.03 0.98 1.01
T0+2 -0.08 0.02 -0.40 0.93 0.73
T0+3 0.09 0.02 0.06 1.03 0.94
Industry-Adjusted Performance Measures 2009-2013
TABLE 5: INDUSTRY-ADJUSTED PEFORMANCE MEASURES SURROUNDING 
TURNOVERS 2009-2013 
FIGURE 7: INDUSTRY-ADJUSTED PERFORMANCE MEASURES 




sample company market values of equity to book values are relatively higher valued 
compared to their peer groups.  
 
6.1.2 RELATIVE PERFORMANCE EVALUATION SURROUNDING CEO TURNOVERS IN 2009 
Looking at the accounting-based performance measures, we see that again ROE shows high 
instability in the period of measurement. The sample companies start out in 2008 by having 
1% lower ROE compared to their peers on average. The following year is however 
characterized by an increase to industry-adjusted ROE value of 0.04, beating the peer 
companies to a large extent. The following years after turnovers are recognized by decrease, 
increase and decrease, before ending up at a value of 0.06 in 2012. It seems that the situation 
of being superior to their peers has stabilized somewhat after the turnover, which is a good 
sign moving forward. 
There is however not 
stability with regards to 
increasing difference, 
which supports the first 
hypothesis of the thesis.  
The EBITDA margin and 
ROA have actually 
provided somewhat 
sustainable growth 
throughout the period of 
measurement, supporting 
Denis & Denis (1995), 
Coughlan & Schmidt 
(1985) and Warner et al. 
(1988). While ROA only 
increases by 0.01 the first 
year of measurement, the 
EBITDA margin increases 
both the first year, and the third year of measurement. It must be stated that the EBITDA 
margin remains negative all five years, meaning that the sample companies had poorer 
Year ROE ROA EBITDA Margin Total Q Price/Book
2008 -0.01 0.00 -0.14 2.07 0.98
2009 (T0) 0.04 0.01 -0.01 2.70 1.96
2010 0.01 0.01 -0.01 1.95 2.11
2011 0.10 0.01 0.00 1.74 1.73
2012 0.06 0.01 0.00 2.33 1.79











































Industry-Adjusted Performance Measures For CEO 
Turnovers in 2009 
ROE EBITDA Margin ROA Total Q Price/Book 
TABLE 6: INDUSTRY-ADJUSTED PERFORMANCE MEASURES FOR 
TURNOVERS IN 2009 
FIGURE 8: INDUSTRY-ADJUSTED PERFORMANCE MEASURES FOR 




operating margins than their peer group all period. The gap is however diminishing which 
means that the companies of interest improved more than their peers through the period 
looking at this margin. ROA develops from being approximately equal to peer group before 
the turnover, to being slightly better in the years following the turnover. This means that the 
sample companies were better to create returns to their total assets compared to their peers 
throughout the period. 
For the turnovers finding place in 2009, I calculate the Total Q ratio in total to experience an 
increase by 12.56% in the period from 2008 to 2012. Starting at a value of 2.07 in 2008, the 
ratio increases to 2.70 in the transition year of the CEOs. The value then drops first to 1.95 in 
2010, before falling further to 1.74 in 2011. The last year of measurement represents an 
increase of 34%. It might seem that the implementation of the new CEO leads to a temporary 
decrease of the ratio, before it turns back to the trend of increasing. This might be caused by 
the companies downsizing their book value of assets in the years directly following CEO 
change, as stated by Denis & Denis (1997). The sharp increase in the Total Q the last year of 
measurement could mean that the sample companies are seen as more overvalued compared 
to their peers. In this way, the market values the sample companies’ value relatively higher 
compared to book value of assets. This might be caused by the sample companies having 
interesting prospects on average for this year, compared to peers. The Price/Book ratio 
supports the Total Q in that it is positive every year of measurement. This suggests that the 
market presuppose the value of equity of the sample firms to be greater than their book value, 
and to a greater extent compared to peer companies. The Price/Book ratio turns from 
decrease to increase and increase to decrease, meaning that there is not a clear pattern 
regarding the comparison of sample firms and their peer group. Being higher than 1 post-
turnover suggests however that there are more stocks regarded as growth stocks. 
 
6.1.3 RELATIVE PERFORMANCE EVALUATION SURROUNDING CEO TURNOVERS IN 2010 
The accounting-based performance measures ROE and EBITDA seem at first glance to 
follow the findings of Denis & Denis (1995), Coughlan & Schmidt (1985) and Warner et al. 
(1988) quite well. Looking at Figure 9 we see that the ROE ratio dropped in the year prior to 
the turnover, and had a big positive change the first year following the turnover. This change 
relates well to Denis & Denis (1995), Coughlan & Schmidt (1985) and Warner et al. (1988). 




way, we see however great instability looking at this measure, further complementing the 
first hypothesis.  
The EBITDA margin show the same relationship in the years before and after turnover (T0) 
as ROE. The margin falls the year before the turnover going from 0.01 to -0.09. The first year 
of the new CEO represents however an increase to 0.04. The second year is represented by a 
slight decrease, before ending up at 0.06 in 2013. The turnover has in other words led to the 
sample companies having better operating numbers than their peers. We see that ROA 
improves the first year of measurement. Starting at a value of 0.02 it increases by 0.01 the 
year before turnover, before falling back to 0.02 in the year following the turnover. Here it 
stays until the last year of measurement.  
Observing Figure 9, we see that the two market-based performance measures show two 
complete different developments. Total Q starts out by having a value of -0.19, being 
relatively lower compared 
to the peer groups. The 
rest of the years are 
followed by increases in 
the ratio except from the 
first year of the new CEO, 
which sees a reduction of 
21%. The Price-to-Book 
ratio in contrary, starts out 
with a value of 1.45 in 
2009 before falling 
steadily until it reaches a 
value of 0.71 in 2012. The 
last year is recognized by 
an increase of 2.82%. It 
seems as though the 
market values the total 


















































Industry-Adjusted Performance Measures for 
Turnovers in 2010 
ROE EBITDA Margin ROA Total Q Price/Book 
Year ROE ROA
EBITDA 
Margin Total Q Price/Book
2009 0.15 0.02 0.01 -0.19 1.45
2010 (T0) -0.07 0.03 -0.09 0.14 1.07
2011 0.09 0.02 0.04 0.11 0.79
2012 -0.02 0.02 0.02 0.50 0.71
2013 0.01 0.02 0.06 0.79 0.73
Industry-Adjusted Performance Measures for Turnovers in 2010
TABLE 7: INDUSTRY-ADJUSTED PERFORMANCE MEASURES FOR 
TURNOVERS IN 2010 
FIGURE 9: INDUSTRY-ADJUSTED PERFORMANCE MEASURES FOR 




increasingly higher than the book value, while the market regards the value of equity as 
increasingly lower than the book value. In this way, the market must value the debt of the 
company as much higher than their actual book value.  
6.1.4 RELATIVE PERFORMANCE EVALUATION SURROUNDING CEO TURNOVERS IN 2011 
Observing Figure 10 below we can see that ROE is recognized by decreasing values the first 
three years of measurement. We observe however that the margin starts increasing from 2012 
an onwards, providing a positive value of 0.15 in 2014. This means essentially that the 
sample companies have had greater increase in ROE relative to their peers the last two years 
of measurement. It seems that making the turnover in 2011, has provided positive effects on 
the return to shareholders the 
following years for the sample 
companies.  
 
The EBITDA ratio shows a 
somewhat different 
development. After increasing 
the first two years of 
measurement, we see a 
decrease from 0.01 to -1.80 
between 2012 and 2013. The 
last year shows a large 
increase in value. It is hard to 
make a conclusion with 
regards to effects of turnovers, 
because of the fluctuations in 
the values. The ROA is much 
more stable in the period, only 
dropping slightly in the year 
prior to turnover and 
increasing slightly between 2013 and 2014. 
Year ROE ROA
EBITDA 
Margin Total Q Price/Book
2010 0.07 0.01 -0.02 0.23 1.40
2011 (T0) -0.12 0.00 0.00 0.14 0.95
2012 -0.19 0.00 0.01 0.38 1.22
2013 -0.03 0.00 -1.80 1.13 0.57
2014 0.15 0.01 0.04 0.07 0.74












































Industry-Adjusted Performance Measures for 
Turnovers in 2011 
ROE EBITDA Margin ROA Total Q Price/Book 
TABLE 8: INDUSTRY-ADJUSTED PERFORMANCE MEASURES FOR 
TURNOVERS IN 2011 
FIGURE 10: INDUSTRY-ADJUSTED PERFORMANCE MEASURES FOR 




The Price/Book ratio seems in general to follow a downward sloping trend in the years of 
measurement, developing from 0.23 in 2010 to 0.07 in 2014. The only year of increase is the 
transition years of CEO, which shouldn’t come as an effect of the change. The positive values 
every year suggests that the sample companies provide higher Price/Book ratios than their 
peers, every year of measurement. Essentially, the market values the equity of the sample 
companies as higher than those of the peers. However, at a diminishing rate. The Total Q 
increases steadily throughout the period, before decreasing sharply between 2013 and 2014. 
Being positive every year, the market values the assets of the sample companies relatively 
higher than book value compared to peer companies.  
	  
6.1.5 RELATIVE PERFORMANCE EVALUATION SURROUNDING CEO TURNOVERS IN 2012 
For the turnovers taking place in 2012, we can see that EBITDA margin follows the findings 
of Denis & Denis (1995), Coughlan & Schmidt (1985) and Warner et al. (1988) quite well. 
The margin is recognized by a decrease of 75% the year prior to turnover, before increasing 
steadily every year until 2015, 
ending up at a value of 0.09 in 
2015. The operating 
profitability of the sample 
companies have in other 
words been better than those 
of the peer companies after 
the CEO change. The ROE 
can be said to have sustained 
good results in the transition 
year, as well as the first year 
of employment for the new 
CEO. We see however that the 
ratio dropped between 2013 
and 2014, before increasing 
the last year of measurement. 
Looking at the ROA values in 
Year ROE ROA
EBITDA 
Margin Total Q Price/Book
2011 -0.08 0.01 0.04 0.01 1.01
2012 (T0) 0.17 0.02 0.01 -0.07 1.20
2013 0.19 0.02 0.04 0.71 0.83
2014 -0.01 0.02 0.05 0.31 0.46
2015 0.12 0.03 0.09 0.34 0.97











































Industry-Adjusted Performance Measures for 
Turnovers in 2012 
ROE EBITDA Margin ROA Total Q Price/Book 
TABLE 9: INDUSTRY-ADJUSTED PERFORMANCE MEASURES FOR 
TURNOVERS IN 2012 
FIGURE 11: INDUSTRY-ADJUSTED PERFORMANCE MEASURES FOR 




Table 9 we see that the values have increased steadily for the sample. The sample companies 
have in other words done better than their peers every year with respect to this measure.  
The Total Q ratio shows a decrease in value in the year before the CEO transition, providing 
a negative value of 0.07 in 2012. The years after the turnover is recognized by positive 
industry-adjusted Total Q ratios. It seems in general as the market value of asset for the 
sample companies are valued relatively higher to the book value compared to peer 
companies. In this way, it seems as though the sample companies have obtained positive 
consensus by the market following the turnover.   
 
6.1.6 RELATIVE PERFORMANCE EVALUATION SURROUNDING CEO TURNOVERS IN 2013 
Looking at the Table 10 and Figure 12 representing turnovers in 2013, we see that the values 
for 2016 are 0 all together. This is as previously mentioned because of data not accessible for 
this year. This means 
one less year of analysis 
for these turnovers.	   
From the table and 
figure, we can see that 
the Total Q ratio, ROA 
and ROE fluctuate 
largely on a year to year 
basis. There are no signs 
of stable patterns going 
forward. The Total Q 
ratio has however 
increased to being 
positive looking at the 
whole period of 
measurement all 
together, ending up at a 
value of 1.43 in 2015. 
The mean of the 







































Industry-Adjusted Performance Measures for 
Turnovers in 2013 
ROE EBITDA Margin ROA Total Q Price/Book 
TABLE 10: INDUSTRY-ADJUSTED PERFORMANCE MEASURES FOR 
TURNOVERS IN 2013 
FIGURE 12: INDUSTRY-ADJUSTED PERFORMANCE MEASURES FOR 
TURNOVERS IN 2014 
Year Total Q ROE
EBITDA 
Margin ROA Price/Book
2012 -0.15 0.78 0.04 -0.01 1.29
2013 (T0) 2.04 0.11 0.04 -0.02 0.85
2014 4.77 0.41 0.06 -0.01 0.75
2015 1.43 -0.13 0.01 -0.03 0.74
2016 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00




however declining by 83% the following year. The findings from this sample of turnovers fall 
well in line with the first hypothesis of the thesis.    
 
6.2 RESULTS OF COMPENSATION EFFECTS ON FIRM PERFORMANCE 
(HYPOTHESIS 2) 
	  
This chapter presents the results-analyses connected to the second hypothesis of the thesis. 
Section 6.2.1 seeks to capture common effects shared among all regression methodologies. 
The focus moves then over to each individual regression model, trying to capture regression-
specific results. Section 6.2.2, 6.2.3 and 6.2.4 contain analyses of OLS model one, two and 
three respectively. Section 6.2.5 and 6.2.6 addresses the fixed effects and random effects 
models.  
6.2.1 THE BIG PICTURE: OBSERVING ALL FOUR REGRESSION-METHODOLOGIES 
COLLECTIVELY 
Looking at all five regression analyses in Tables 11,12,13,14 and 15 collectively in this 
chapter, we register that the positive coefficient of (1) Option Grants (%) on industry-
adjusted ROA is something that emerge in all regressions. This finding is something that 
argues in the direction that increasing the relative fraction of Options Grants (%) for CEOs 
soon after their employment, could lead to increased industry-adjusted ROA for the sample 
companies (holding every other variable constant). The coefficient show significance at 10% 
level in the OLS model 3, fixed effects model and random effects model respectively. A 
higher ROA could mean that the CEOs are motivated to affect the EBIT results of the 
companies for the better.  
Similar to the unambiguous relationship between Option Grants (%) and Industry-Adjusted 
ROA, we see a (2) repeating positive relationship between New Stock Grants (%) and the 
price-to-book ratio for all methodologies assessed. The coefficient on stock grants show 
positive signs, being significant at 5% level in the random effects model. The relationship 
indicates that an increase in option grants as a fraction of total compensation in year one post-
turnover, could lead to an increase in price-to-book, ceteris paribus. In this way, it seems as 
though increasing the fraction of option grants early after employment leads to increased 




positively to the fact that the new CEO is provided with more option grants. Increased 
provision of such grants to a CEO could provide a signal that the company believes in both 
the manager and the future prospects of the firms, and might therefore create increased 
consensus regarding equity value.  
Focusing on the sign of the coefficients of the different incentive-based compensation 
components, and not so much on significance, we can see (3) that several of them provide 
positive relationships to the accounting-based performance measures. New Stock Grants (%) 
provide positive signs for all five regressions when regressed on industry-adjusted ROA. 
Neither of the five regressions provide significant values for the relation. Nevertheless, being 
positive in all five is an interesting finding. This could imply that providing CEOs with new 
stock grants might cause effects on the returns to assets. One of the reasons why boards 
include new equity in CEO compensation in the first place is that it hopefully motivates the 
company CEOs to affect company performance.  
Common relationships regarding coefficient signs are also found between (4) New Stock 
Grants (%) and industry-adjusted ROE for the sample companies. These are positive for four 
out of five regressions tested (all except the two-year lag OLS model), indicating that the 
increase of new stock grants as a fraction of total compensation could increase the 
performance measure. This could also be interpreted as providing short term effects, as the 
longer lagged model is not consistent. ROE is as previously mentioned dependent on 
earnings in the nominator, which essentially means that the increased value of ROE suggests 
that the companies create better bottom-line results. Such an improvement often comes from 
companies improving their revenues, or reducing their costs. There are many ways 
management can facilitate such a change. Examples of these are improved production, 
increased prices, lower interest payments and so on. The already existing fraction of CEO 
ownership seem to affect the marked-based measure of Total Q negatively. The variable 
Stock Owned by CEO (%) provides large negative coefficients, indicating that the existing 
ownership of the CEOs have a decreasing impact on the market value of total capital for the 
sample companies.  
Observing the four shared findings above, we learn that equities as incentive-based 
compensation factors seems to explain performance well in different ways. Their significant 
values support the results from those of Blackwell et al. (2007), Mehran (1995) as well as 




6.2.2 RESULTS OF ONE-YEAR EFFECTS USING OLS MODEL 1  
The following section presents the results connected to OLS model 1. In other words, to see 
effects of incentive-based compensation from year one post-turnover on industry-adjusted 
performance in year two post turnover individually.   
ACCOUNTING BASED PERFORMANCE 
From the regressions in Table 11, we can see that the variable Option Grants (%) produces a 
significant coefficient on the EBITDA margin at 1% level, providing a value of 0.212. 
Essentially, this means that looking at this regression model individually, and holding every 
other variable constant, an increase in the proportion of option grants in year one after 
turnover should lead to an increase in the industry-adjusted EBITDA margin for the 
companies on average in year two after turnover. The operating profitability of the sample 
companies seem in other words improved relative to their peer groups looking at the results 
between year one and two after turnover. Such short-term effects of compensation provide 
valuable information to company remuneration boards, when deciding upon compensation 
during recessions. The relationship supports the second hypothesis as it indicates a positive 
relation between incentive-based compensation and firm performance. More specifically, it 
seems that providing CEO with relatively higher fraction of options lead companies to having 
higher profitability on the money earned from their sales. The finding further supports those 
of Mehran (1995).  
 
We can further observe the positive significant relationship of Option Grants (%) on the 
industry-adjusted ROE at 10% level. The variable returns a coefficient of 0.537, which 
essentially pulls in the direction that increasing the proportion of CEO option grants in year 
one by one percentage point, leads to the increase in the ROE ratio of 0.573 percentage 
points, holding every other variable constant. Receiving option grants might motivate the 
CEOs into providing solid results for the company, creating increased earnings to the equity 
of the shareholders. This falls otherwise also in line with the second hypothesis of the thesis. 
We saw in the Data section that a change in ROE can be caused by different actions. It could 
be caused by an increase in the net profit margin, asset turnover etc.  
An interesting relationship with regards to the accounting-based measures is the strong 
negative relationship between the age-dummy and industry-adjusted ROA. We see 
specifically that the coefficient returns a negative value of 0.0312, being significant at 1% 




returns to the company assets, compared to the CEOs below 60 years of age. This might 
appear as a result of horizon issues as mentioned in Section 5.2.4. Older CEOs might suffer a 
lack of motivation as a result of being close to retirement, and thereby struggling to help 
improve the returns to the company assets.  
MARKET-BASED PERFORMANCE 
There are no significant relationships between incentive-based compensation factors and 
market-based performance measures, observing the regression outputs in Table 11. We see 
however that R&D/Sales provide a highly significant correlation with firm price-to-book 
ratio. The relationship can be caused by the market reacting negatively on increased R&D 
spending the previous year. This might be because of the economic shape of the sample 
companies, or the fact that the market thinks that the timing of high R&D spending is not the 
best. We can further observe a positive significant relationship between the LT-Debt/Total 
Assets-variable and the Total Q. This might indicate that the increasing use of debt in year 
one post-turnover leads to higher short-term market consensus of total assets of the firm the 
following year (holding every other variable constant). Increasing the debt levels might 
indicate that the sample companies have exciting projects under development that could 
improve the capital of the firm.  
Another interesting finding is the negative coefficient related to the departure-dummy on 
company Total Q. This essentially tells us that forcing the outgoing CEO out of the office, 
provide negative impacts on the company results in year two post-turnover. It could be that 
the market reacts negatively to such a decision, and adjust their expectations to the value of 
total capital down. We can further see that the age-dummy provides a negative coefficient 
when regressed on Total Q. This suggests that having a CEO older than 60 years old, leads to 
lower Total Q values, all else equal. The market might interpret the total value of a company, 
of having such a CEO, as lower than the stated book values. The significance level is 



































Heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors in parenthesis. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10. 
The dependent variables represent industry-adjusted performance measures as measured in 
year two after turnover. The independent and control variables are lagged by one year in 
attempt to measure the effects of compensation and firm characteristics on the performance 
measures. All data are retrieved from WRDS Database. Regressions performed using Stata. 
TABLE 11:  OLS MODEL 1 REGRESSION. FULL SAMPLE 
!
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 

























 (0.376) (0.0240) (0.0645) (2.087) (0.788) 
      
Option Grants (%) 0.573* 0.0409 0.212*** 0.516 -1.197 
 (0.321) (0.0298) (0.0751) (2.534) (0.770) 
      
Bonus (%) -0.331 -0.0134 0.0262 4.264 1.340 
 (0.780) (0.124) (0.178) (9.021) (1.582) 
      
Stock Owned by CEO (%) 3.352 -0.200 0.162 -51.53 -5.503 
 (2.570) (0.243) (0.330) (32.32) (3.868) 
      
Ln (Total Assets) 0.147 0.00351 0.0110 -0.569 0.0341 
 (0.120) (0.00506) (0.0130) (0.345) (0.0784) 
      
R&D/Sales -1.242 0.00948 -1.259*** -1.445 -2.157*** 
 (1.639) (0.0840) (0.423) (1.040) (0.597) 
      
LT-Debt/Total Assets 0.235 0.0439 0.0512 3.166* -1.212 
 (0.298) (0.0340) (0.0431) (1.729) (0.770) 
      
Departure-Dummy 0.214 -0.0105 0.0398 -1.580* -0.215 
 (0.176) (0.0198) (0.0607) (0.830) (0.476) 
      
Recruiting-Dummy -0.119 -0.0153 -0.0316 -0.342 -0.515 
 (0.123) (0.0198) (0.0396) (0.926) (0.686) 
      
Age-Dummy -0.0606 -0.0312*** -0.0377 -1.961* -0.0477 
 (0.0999) (0.0109) (0.0230) (1.159) (0.366) 
      
Gender-Dummy -0.0727 -0.00923 -0.0266 1.198* -0.0786 
 (0.138) (0.0181) (0.0419) (0.677) (0.751) 
      
CapEx/Total Assets -2.762 0.0670 -1.453** -8.568 1.245 
 (1.894) (0.177) (0.662) (14.57) (3.817) 
      
Acquisition/Total Assets 1.061* 0.116* 0.284* -1.520 1.935 
 (0.624) (0.0629) (0.156) (3.219) (3.042) 
      
Intercept -1.229 -0.00716 0.0154 4.322 1.045 
 (1.102) (0.0545) (0.134) (3.111) (0.888) 
 
Observations 636 636 635 243 499 




6.2.3 RESULTS OF ONE-YEAR EFFECTS USING OLS MODEL 2 
ACCOUNTING-BASED PERFORMANCE 
From Table 12 on the next page, we see that the positive relationship between Option Grants 
(%) and the EBITDA margin is the only one being significant when looking at the incentive-
based compensation factors of the regressions conducted. This is a similar finding to the first 
OLS model, however now only showing significance at 5% level. The coefficient can be 
interpreted as providing the CEOs with extra option grants in the second year of employment 
leads to the increase of EBITDA returns to sales of the company in year three after the 
turnover. This means that the CEOs might be motivated to affect firm performance positively 
regardless of the year in which they are received. A second finding, looking the Table 12 is 
that Bonus (%) provide negative coefficients on all accounting-based measures. In this way, it 
seems as though increasing the amount of bonus for the incoming CEOs in their second year 
of employment, provide negative impact on the accounting performance of the firms. It must 
be kept in mind that bonus was one of the compensation factors that contained the lowest 
share of total compensation for the sample incoming CEOs (Table 3). It might therefore be 
that the CEOs react negatively from being provided with such a low share of bonus. Looking 
further down the table, we see that R&D/Sales captures a lot of explanatory power for the 
accounting-based measures. Being positive and significant at 1% level confirms this.  
MARKET-BASED PERFORMANCE 
The regression model does not provide any significant relationships among marked-based 
measures and incentive-based compensation. We can observe however the negative impact 
on both Total Q and price-to-book from Option Grants (%). Hence, it seems as though 
providing the CEOs with extra options in the second year of employment might lead to 
decreasing marked-based performance measures in year three post-turnover. This implies that 
the market values in both cases turn relatively lower compared to the book values, holding 
every other variable constant. It could be that the market believes that providing the CEO 
with such incentives in the second year, will lead to a manager that does not perform to the 


































Heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors in parenthesis. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, 
*p<0.01. Dependent variables represent industry-adjusted performance measures as 
measured in year three post-turnover. Independent and control variables are lagged on 
year in an attempt to measure effects of compensation and firm characteristics on firm 
industry-adjusted performance. All data are retrieved from WRDS. Stata is used to 
perform the regressions.   
TABLE 12: OLS MODEL 2 REGRESSION. FULL SAMPLE. 
!
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 

























 (0.263) (0.0277) (0.0629) (3.746) (1.227) 
      
Option Grants (%) -0.0733 0.0528 0.157** -0.0623 -0.893 
 (0.325) (0.0343) (0.0777) (4.079) (1.494) 
      
Bonus (%) -0.283 -0.0785 -0.0635 -9.213 3.131 
 (0.596) (0.0627) (0.142) (6.472) (2.658) 
      
Stock Owned by CEO (%) -0.273 0.196 0.569 -42.26 5.150 
 (2.653) (0.279) (0.634) (48.29) (11.35) 
      
Ln (Total Assets) -0.0212 0.00325 0.0147** -0.617 -0.102 
 (0.0306) (0.00322) (0.00731) (0.409) (0.135) 
      
R&D/Sales 0.892*** 0.0727*** 0.318*** -0.953 -1.302 
 (0.206) (0.0217) (0.0492) (1.651) (0.818) 
      
LT-Debt/Total Assets 0.370* 0.0440* 0.0892* 2.759 1.448 
 (0.223) (0.0234) (0.0532) (2.154) (1.318) 
      
Departure-Dummy 0.592*** -0.0178 -0.0248 -0.829 -0.287 
 (0.205) (0.0216) (0.0490) (1.985) (0.855) 
      
Recruiting-Dummy -0.106 0.00919 -0.00141 0.552 -0.355 
 (0.158) (0.0167) (0.0378) (2.118) (0.672) 
      
Age-Dummy -0.00635 -0.0178 -0.00301 -2.680 -0.804 
 (0.138) (0.0145) (0.0329) (2.001) (0.602) 
      
Gender-Dummy 0.0205 -0.00548 -0.0341 1.453 -0.395 
 (0.203) (0.0214) (0.0485) (2.671) (0.859) 
      
CapEx/Total Assets 0.0140 0.102 -0.606** -13.67 -1.631 
 (1.051) (0.111) (0.251) (19.81) (4.924) 
      
Acquisitions/Total Assets 0.0304 0.188** 0.452** -7.947 -4.961 
 (0.903) (0.0951) (0.216) (14.25) (3.661) 
      
Intercept 0.153 -0.0414 -0.0939 5.434 2.163 
 (0.354) (0.0372) (0.0845) (5.028) (1.506) 
 
Observations 459 459 459 148 365 




6.2.4 RESULTS OF TWO-YEAR EFFECTS USING OLS MODEL 3 
ACCOUNTING-BASED PERFORMANCE 
Observing Table 13 below, and the two-year effects, we see that Option Grants (%) provide a 
positive significant relationship to industry-adjusted ROA. The coefficient is significant at 
10% level, and provides a positive coefficient of 0.0589. This means that providing the 
sample CEOs with option grants in their first year of employment provides effects on the 
company ROA two years after, holding every other variable constant. This is an interesting 
finding, as it seems that providing CEOs with option grants early after employment, can lead 
to long-term motivational effects. The ROA is, as mentioned, measured by having EBIT in 
the numerator. The effects relate more specifically to the motivation of managers to affect the 
operating profitability of the sample companies before the deduction of tax has been made. 
We can further see that the growth proxy (R&D/Sales) provides highly significant effects to 
the accounting-based measures of the sample firms. In this way, it seems as though 
increasing the use of surplus from sales on R&D in the first year after turnover leads to 
increasing accounting measures the following year. We can observe that the return on equity 
is the one most highly affected by the growth proxy, providing a positive coefficient of 1.534. 
In this way, an increase in the R&D/Sales in the first year of CEO employment leads to ROE 
increasing by 1.534 percentage points two years after. Another interesting finding is the 
highly significant coefficient on the departure-dummy. The dummy takes a value of 0.570 
indicating that forced turnovers lead to higher returns to equity, compared to having 
voluntary turnovers.  
MARKET-BASED PERFORMANCE 
Observing the market-based performance measures, we see that the size dummy (Ln (Total 
Assets)) is the only one providing a significant coefficient. The coefficient is significant at 
5% level providing a negative value of 0.881 in the regression including Total Q. This in turn 
could mean that increasing the total assets of the firm leads to negative Total Q two years 
after. It seems as though the market reacts negatively by the fact that the firms increase their 
size in this time period. They believe in other words that the value of total capitalization of 




































Heteroscedasticity-consistent standard error in parenthesis. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05 *p<0.10. 
Dependent variables represent industry-adjusted performance measures in year three post-
turnover. Independent and control variables are lagged two years, in an attempt to measure 
effects of compensation and firm characteristics on the performance measures. All data are 
retrieved from WRDS. Stata is used to perform regressions. 
TABLE 13: OLS MODEL 3 REGRESSION. FULL SAMPLE. 
!
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 

























 (0.245) (0.0264) (0.0582) (3.580) (1.069) 
      
Option Grants (%) -0.344 0.0589* 0.0827 0.704 -0.814 
 (0.318) (0.0342) (0.0755) (4.189) (1.389) 
      
Bonus (%) -0.458 -0.00768 0.0167 -7.835 3.450 
 (0.584) (0.0628) (0.138) (6.202) (2.667) 
      
Stock Owned by CEO (%) -0.767 -0.0141 0.0757 -38.64 3.526 
 (2.747) (0.296) (0.652) (60.14) (11.08) 
      
Ln (Total Assets) -0.00567 0.00387 0.0154** -0.881** -0.00558 
 (0.0307) (0.00330) (0.00728) (0.418) (0.128) 
      
R&D/Sales 1.534*** 0.169*** 0.683*** -1.626 -2.343 
 (0.377) (0.0406) (0.0895) (3.158) (1.500) 
      
LT-Debt/Total Assets 0.473** 0.0434* 0.0920* 2.946 1.036 
 (0.230) (0.0248) (0.0546) (2.279) (1.310) 
      
Departure-Dummy 0.570*** -0.0172 -0.0264 -0.772 -0.178 
 (0.206) (0.0222) (0.0489) (1.991) (0.828) 
      
Recruiting-Dummy -0.0972 -0.00424 -0.0178 0.314 -0.298 
 (0.156) (0.0168) (0.0371) (2.189) (0.648) 
      
Age-Dummy -0.0465 -0.0127 -0.00139 -2.292 -0.736 
 (0.136) (0.0146) (0.0323) (1.994) (0.581) 
      
Gender-Dummy 0.000494 -0.0141 -0.0360 1.143 -0.347 
 (0.211) (0.0227) (0.0500) (2.716) (0.855) 
      
CapEx/Total Assets -0.143 0.206* -0.333 -20.39 -2.118 
 (1.082) (0.116) (0.257) (21.73) (4.912) 
      
Acquisition/Total Assets -0.397 0.108 0.189 -4.911 2.641 
 (0.780) (0.0839) (0.185) (10.92) (3.995) 
      
Intercept 0.166 -0.0282 -0.0696 6.116 1.672 
 (0.361) (0.0388) (0.0856) (5.162) (1.428) 
 
 
Observations 462 462 462 145 381 




6.2.4 RESULTS OF COMPENSATION EFFECTS USING RANDOM EFFECTS MODEL 
	  
ACCOUNTING-BASED PERFORMANCE 
Looking at the random effects model in Table 14 on the next page, we can see that Option 
Grants (%) is the only variable that creates a significant coefficient, when regressed on the 
accounting-based measures. The coefficient is significant at 10% level on the industry-
adjusted ROA, providing a coefficient of 0.0250. This means that providing the CEOs with 
one percentage point extra of Option Grants leads to an increase in the industry-adjusted 
ROA by 0.0250 percentage points (holding every other variable constant) the next year. We 
can again see that the growth proxy (R&D/sales) captures most of the explanation, providing 
positive significance at 1% level. Essentially, it seems that the accounting-based ratios are 
largely affected by the use of R&D expenditures the previous year. We can again observe the 
negative relationship between the age-dummy and the ROA, implying that the CEOs over 60 
provide lower returns to the company assets compared to the CEOs younger than 60. The 
growth- and size proxy provide us with highly significant positive coefficients moving 
forward.  
MARKET-BASED PERFORMANCE 
I find a strong positive relationship between New Stock Grants (%) and P/B looking at the 
market-based performance measures. The relationship is significant at 5% level, and provides 
a coefficient of 1.273. In other words, increasing the fraction of new stock grants as a share 
of total compensation seems to make a positive impact on the price-to-book value the 
following year for the sample companies (holding every other variable constant) An 
increasing price-to-book can be caused by the market obtaining higher expectations for the 
value of equity on short term. Providing CEO with extra stock grants might indicate that the 
company believes in the manager and future prospects of the firm. We can additionally see 
that Bonus (%) provides a positive significant relationship to Total Q. The coefficient is 
significant at 10% level, taking a value of 5.207. In other words, increasing the amount of 




































Standard errors in parenthesis. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10. Dependent variables 
represent industry-adjusted performance measures from year two and three post-turnover. 
Dependent variables are lagged by one year respectively. All data used are retrieved from 
WRDS. Stata is used to perform the regressions.  
TABLE 14: RANDOM EFFECTS REGRESSION. FULL SAMPLE 
!
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 

























 (0.240) (0.0120) (0.0391) (1.374) (0.527) 
      
Option Awards (%) 0.387 0.0250* -0.0293 0.360 -0.439 
 (0.304) (0.0150) (0.0490) (1.636) (0.700) 
      
Bonus (%) 0.0418 0.0299 -0.0161 5.207* 0.726 
 (0.616) (0.0316) (0.103) (2.973) (1.344) 
      
Stock Owned by CEO (%) 3.522 -0.131 0.397 -35.77 -3.128 
 (3.435) (0.206) (0.673) (33.13) (6.381) 
      
Ln (Total Assets) 0.145*** 0.00514* 0.0436*** -0.457* 0.0321 
 (0.0465) (0.00291) (0.00953) (0.246) (0.0910) 
      
R&D/Sales 2.406*** 0.153*** 1.586*** -0.398 -0.875 
 (0.347) (0.0183) (0.0598) (1.173) (0.651) 
      
LT-Debt/Total Assets 0.279 0.0427** 0.128** 3.368** -0.218 
 (0.331) (0.0199) (0.0651) (1.532) (0.771) 
      
Departure-Dummy 0.467 -0.00808 0.0447 -1.422 -0.250 
 (0.375) (0.0240) (0.0786) (1.424) (0.677) 
      
Recruiting-Dummy -0.172 -0.0172 -0.0649 -0.423 -0.253 
 (0.264) (0.0169) (0.0555) (1.332) (0.507) 
      
Age-Dummy -0.0164 -0.0199* 0.0166 -1.439 -0.169 
 (0.186) (0.0103) (0.0336) (1.117) (0.394) 
      
Gender-Dummy -0.158 -0.0135 -0.0838 0.908 -0.174 
 (0.353) (0.0225) (0.0738) (1.796) (0.670) 
      
CapEx/Total Assets -0.972 -0.0503 -0.803*** -4.722 0.608 
 (1.503) (0.0856) (0.280) (10.95) (3.232) 
      
Acquisitions/Total Assets 0.205 0.0140 0.0368 -1.370 -0.661 
 (0.657) (0.0316) (0.103) (3.806) (1.440) 
      
Intercept -1.206** -0.0145 -0.248** 3.521 0.767 
 (0.575) (0.0362) (0.119) (3.080) (1.083) 
 
Observations 1095 1095 1094 391 864 




6.2.5 RESULTS OF COMPENSATION EFFECTS USING FIXED EFFECTS MODEL 
	  
ACCOUNTING-BASED PERFORMANCE 
Taking a specific look at the accounting-based performance measures in Table 15, we can 
observe the positive correlation between Option Grants (%) and the industry-adjusted ROE. 
This is something that was additionally found in the first OLS model in Section 6.2.2. The 
coefficient takes a value of 0.760 this time, which indicates that increasing the relative 
fraction of option grants by one percentage point, could lead to the increase in ROE by 0.760 
percentage points the following year (holding every other variable constant). Being provided 
with new equity grants seems in other words to motivate the managers to affect the returns to 
shareholders equity. The Option Grants (%) variable causes a positive relationship to the 
ROA additionally. Being significant at 10% level, and providing a coefficient of 0.0275 
indicates that increasing the option awards as a share of total compensation, ceteris paribus, 
leads to the increase of ROA by 0.0275 percentage points. It seems otherwise as the 
R&D/Sales variable explains a lot of the change in the accounting-based performance 
measures. The control variable provides positive coefficients for all accounting-based ratios 
at 1% level, indicating that spending the company revenue on R&D early after a new CEO 
appointment leads to the increase of operating performance, as well as bottom-line 
performance.  
MARKET-BASED PERFORMANCE 
From Table 15, we can again see the positive relationship between Bonus (%) and Total Q, 
strengthening the findings of the random effects model. The significance level is now at 5%, 
being stronger compared to the 10% relationship found previously. The price-book ratio 
provides no significant relationships to the explanatory variables moving forward. Focusing 
on the signs, we can see that New Stock Grants (%) and Option Grants (%) both provide 
positive coefficients with respect to Total Q and price-to-book, indicating that they both 
should have positive impacts on the marked-based performance measures. It is however 
difficult to draw any conclusions as they are not significant in value. The same can be said 



































Standard errors in parenthesis. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10. Dependent variables 
represent industry-adjusted performance measures from year two and three post-turnover. 
Independent variables are lagged one year respectively in an attempt to measure effects of 
year one explanatory variables on year two dependent variables, as well as year two 
explanatory variables on year three dependent variables. 
TABLE 15: FIXED EFFECTS REGRESSION. FULL SAMPLE 
!
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 

























 (0.290) (0.0133) (0.0325) (1.686) (0.667) 
      
Option Grants (%) 0.760** 0.0275* 0.0425 0.227 0.297 
 (0.359) (0.0165) (0.0403) (2.174) (0.892) 
      
Bonus (%) 0.327 0.0564 -0.0925 9.205** -0.432 
 (0.805) (0.0370) (0.0905) (3.782) (1.835) 
      
Stock Owned by CEO (%) 4.298 -0.0895 -0.375 -11.48 2.357 
 (9.475) (0.436) (1.065) (62.49) (20.90) 
      
Ln (Total Assets) -0.701** 0.0203 0.0823** -0.545 0.228 
 (0.306) (0.0141) (0.0344) (1.486) (0.717) 
      
R&D/Sales 4.733*** 0.204*** 2.524*** -0.216 0.156 
 (0.487) (0.0224) (0.0548) (1.665) (0.981) 
      
LT-Debt/Total Assets -0.596 -0.0113 -0.0385 6.818 0.271 
 (0.927) (0.0426) (0.104) (4.878) (2.228) 
      
Departure-Dummy 0 0 0 0 0 
 (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) 
      
Recruiting-Dummy 0 0 0 0 0 
 (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) 
      
Age-Dummy -0.0251 -0.0148 0.0147 0.0620 0.301 
 (0.312) (0.0144) (0.0351) (2.445) (0.792) 
      
Gender-Dummy 0 0 0 0 0 
 (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) 
      
CapEx/Total Assets 1.770 -0.187 -0.705** -8.891 -2.409 
 (2.865) (0.132) (0.322) (31.61) (7.065) 
      
Acquisitions/Total Assets 0.663 -0.00648 -0.00786 -1.780 -0.799 
 (0.748) (0.0344) (0.0841) (4.887) (1.745) 
      
Intercept 5.371** -0.149 -0.680** 3.449 -1.327 
 (2.430) (0.112) (0.273) (12.16) (5.744) 
 
Observations 1095 1095 1094 391 864 




6.3 RESULTS OF COMPENSATION EFFECTS ON FIRM PERFORMANCE – 
COMPARING LOW OWNERSHIP CEOS TO HIGH OWNERSHIP CEOS 
	  
This section seeks to answer the third hypothesis of the thesis, taking a thorough look at low 
ownership CEOs of the sample, while comparing to high ownership CEOs. Section 6.3.1 
provides an overview of the trends when looking at the regression models connected to low 
ownership CEOs. Section 6.3.2 digs deeper into the regression models connected to high 
ownership CEOs, comparing to the sample of low ownership consecutively.  
6.3.1 LOW OWNERSHIP CEOS  
ACCOUNTING-BASED PERFORMANCE 
Observing the regression Tables 16,17 and 18 we can see that there are several relationships 
between incentive-based compensation factors and performance measures that are shared 
with respect to signs and significance among the different regression models. An interesting 
finding is the positive relationship between New Stock Grants (%) and the EBITDA margin. 
The variable returns positive coefficients for all regression models, being significant at 10% 
level in the second OLS. This relationship aligns well with the third hypothesis indicating 
that CEOs with ownership lower than 5% in the firm, are motivated to affect firm 
performance, being provided with new equity. In this case, it seems as though receiving the 
grants in the second year of employment is the best with respect to timing. The results align 
well with those of Blackwell et al. (2007), Mehran (1995) and others. From Table 3, we 
learned also that low ownership CEOs are being provided more new equity grants relative to 
high ownership CEOs, which could also play a part in these results.  
Observing effects on accounting based-measures further, we can see that Stock Owned by 
CEO (%) provide negative relationships to company industry-adjusted ROA, being 
significant in two out of three models. The first OLS model provides a negative coefficient of 
1.861 at 5% level of significance, while the third OLS model produce a negative relationship 
at 1.762. In this way, it seems as though the already existing low ownership of the CEOs in 
year one after turnover have both short-term and long term negative effects on the industry-
adjusted ROA. Having low ownership in the firm might be a demotivating factor for the 
CEOs, providing worse results for the company.  
Providing the CEOs with more option grants in year one after turnover seems on the other 




The effects on the EBITDA margin are strongest in the first OLS model, which indicates that 
it might be smart to provide the grants in the first year of performance in order to capture 
positive short-term effects. The coefficient is significant at 5% level in the second OLS, 
while it seems to fade out in the third. The effects on ROA is only significant in the second 
OLS model providing significance at 5% level.  
MARKET-BASED PERFORMANCE 
Taking a specific look at the market-based measures in Table 16,17 and 18, we can see that 
Stock Owned by CEO (%) returns negative coefficients on the price-to-book ratio for all 
regression methodologies conducted. The variable is significant in the first and second OLS 
model, indicating that this relationship provides both short-term and long-term effects. 
Having low ownership in the company in year one after turnover, seems in other words to 
create reduced price-to-book ratios for the sample companies in the second and third year 
after turnover respectively (holding every other variable constant). It might be that the market 
anticipates that a low ownership CEO might be less motivated to improve the results of the 
firm. In this way, the market value of equity falls to lower levels. 
A similar relationship is found between CEO option grants and the price-to-book ratio, being 
negative in all three regression models. The relationship is significant at 10% level in the first 
regression model, indicating that there are short-term effects between year one and year two. 
Essentially, providing company CEOs with more option grants in their first year of 
employment seem to decrease the price-to-book ratios of the sample firms the following year. 
We can observe that R&D/Sales obtain negative coefficients in both regression models being 
significant at 1% level on P/B in all three. In this way, we are provided with information that 
hiring a low ownership CEO and increasing the R&D expenditures from company revenue 
early after employment, leads to a decrease in the price-to-book ratio. It seems like the 
combination leads to the market providing lower expectations to the company equity 
compared to the book values on both short-term and long-term. Another finding with regards 
to firm characteristics and market-based measures is the relationship between long term debt 
and firm Total Q. Thus, increasing the debt-levels early after employment for the new CEO 































TABLE 16: OLS MODEL 1 REGRESSION. LOW OWNERSHIP SAMPLE. 
Table 16 shows the outputs from regression model 1 applied on the low ownership 
sample of CEOs. Heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors in parenthesis. 
***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10.  
	  !
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 


























 (0.403) (0.0247) (0.0684) (2.219) (0.853) 
      
Option Grants (%) 0.494 0.0364 0.243*** 0.620 -1.659* 
 (0.343) (0.0309) (0.0810) (2.593) (0.848) 
      
Bonus (%) -0.476 -0.0295 0.0332 5.287 1.448 
 (0.758) (0.128) (0.185) (9.565) (1.633) 
      
Stock Owned by CEO (%) 14.73 -1.861** -2.125 -115.4 -29.18* 
 (14.98) (0.726) (1.628) (71.07) (17.23) 
      
Ln (Total Assets 0.169 0.000807 0.00637 -0.658* -0.0124 
 (0.143) (0.00542) (0.0139) (0.389) (0.0905) 
      
R&D/Sales -1.181 0.00238 -1.286*** -1.551 -2.252*** 
 (1.649) (0.0851) (0.417) (1.136) (0.638) 
      
LT-Debt/Total Assets  0.199 0.0496 0.0594 3.272* -1.234 
 (0.285) (0.0332) (0.0447) (1.815) (0.807) 
      
Departure-Dummy 0.229 -0.0148 0.0349 -1.666* -0.211 
 (0.198) (0.0197) (0.0608) (0.878) (0.503) 
      
Recruiting-Dummy -0.137 -0.0126 -0.0198 -0.264 -0.543 
 (0.139) (0.0202) (0.0397) (1.021) (0.707) 
      
Age-Dummy -0.0654 -0.0307*** -0.0412* -1.915 -0.162 
 (0.0941) (0.0108) (0.0235) (1.182) (0.383) 
      
Gender-Dummy -0.0804 -0.00432 -0.0192 1.310* -0.117 
 (0.154) (0.0178) (0.0422) (0.730) (0.761) 
      
CapEx/Total Assets -2.865 0.0318 -1.564** -10.90 0.913 
 (1.996) (0.181) (0.692) (16.28) (4.033) 
      
Acquisitions/Total Assets 1.238** 0.180** 0.416** -1.229 1.918 
 (0.558) (0.0726) (0.177) (3.696) (3.251) 
      
Intercept -1.424 0.0146 0.0397 5.118 1.696* 
 (1.313) (0.0564) (0.138) (3.522) (1.006) 
 
Observations 606 606 606 235 470 
 
































TABLE 17: OLS MODEL 2 REGRESSION. LOW OWNERHIP SAMPLE 
Heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors in parenthesis. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, 
*p<0.10. Dependent variables represent here the industry-adjusted performance 
measures of the sample companies. The independent variables are lagged by one 
year (i.e. represent year two post-turnover). Regression is produced using Stata.  
!
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 

























 (0.128) (0.0268) (0.0517) (2.200) (1.550) 
      
Option Grants (%) -0.0300 0.0624* 0.169** 0.109 -0.442 
 (0.297) (0.0362) (0.0772) (2.290) (1.241) 
      
Bonus (%) -0.140 -0.0595 -0.0618 -9.482 4.621 
 (0.250) (0.0520) (0.114) (5.770) (2.952) 
      
Stock Owned by CEO (%) -3.985 -0.678 -0.272 -91.44 -11.28 
 (3.419) (0.621) (1.210) (66.87) (43.56) 
      
Ln (Total Assets) -0.0327 0.00208 0.0127 -0.716 -0.166 
 (0.0420) (0.00381) (0.00890) (0.512) (0.134) 
      
R&D/Sales 0.881 0.0727** 0.317*** -1.088 -1.417*** 
 (0.817) (0.0344) (0.0588) (1.130) (0.361) 
      
LT-Debt/Total Assets 0.360 0.0486 0.0954** 2.761** 1.864 
 (0.392) (0.0477) (0.0444) (1.372) (1.846) 
      
Departure-Dummy 0.689 -0.0176 -0.0337 -1.209 -0.219 
 (0.751) (0.0138) (0.0353) (1.355) (0.837) 
      
Recruiting-Dummy -0.136 0.00463 -0.00567 0.609 -0.434 
 (0.0858) (0.0144) (0.0364) (1.176) (0.763) 
      
Age-Dummy -0.0154 -0.0183 -0.00809 -2.817 -0.905* 
 (0.0919) (0.0141) (0.0329) (2.074) (0.477) 
      
Gender-Dummy 0.0255 -0.00538 -0.0335 1.664 -0.414 
 (0.0822) (0.0208) (0.0521) (1.361) (1.347) 
      
CapEx/Total Assets -0.240 0.0521 -0.684*** -18.65 -3.680 
 (0.427) (0.0918) (0.233) (24.10) (5.285) 
      
Acquisitions/Total Assets -0.0499 0.193 0.461 -7.230 -6.697** 
 (0.254) (0.137) (0.457) (5.376) (2.822) 
      
Intercept 0.285 -0.0256 -0.0713 6.270 2.724* 
 (0.257) (0.0341) (0.0812) (4.379) (1.516) 
 
Observations 421 421 421 140 330 

































TABLE 18: OLS MODEL 3 REGRESSION. LOW OWNERSHIP SAMPLE 
Heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors in parenthesis. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, 
*p<0.10. Dependent variables represent industry-adjusted performance measures from 
year three post-turnover. Independent variables are lagged by two years.  
!
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 

























 (0.105) (0.0252) (0.0501) (3.375) (1.426) 
      
Option Grants (%) -0.323 0.0508 0.0999 1.263 -1.569 
 (0.254) (0.0356) (0.0739) (3.413) (1.184) 
      
Bonus (%) -0.322 0.0176 0.0322 -7.882 4.007 
 (0.325) (0.0582) (0.131) (4.913) (3.542) 
      
Stock Owned by CEO (%) -5.387 -1.762** -1.960 -27.34 -57.16* 
 (3.545) (0.684) (1.492) (79.84) (30.48) 
      
Ln (Total Assets) -0.0228 0.00275 0.0102 -0.898 -0.0858 
 (0.0422) (0.00425) (0.0101) (0.583) (0.128) 
      
R&D/Sales 1.543 0.175*** 0.684*** -1.815 -2.427*** 
 (1.371) (0.0651) (0.174) (1.469) (0.793) 
      
LT-Debt/Total Assets 0.476 0.0540 0.0954* 3.066** 1.339 
 (0.417) (0.0487) (0.0534) (1.474) (1.907) 
      
Departure-Dummy 0.669 -0.0192 -0.0416 -0.923 -0.423 
 (0.751) (0.0142) (0.0364) (1.330) (0.842) 
      
Recruiting-Dummy -0.142* 0.00422 -0.00846 0.317 -0.270 
 (0.0856) (0.0140) (0.0339) (1.247) (0.769) 
      
Age-Dummy -0.0340 -0.0188 -0.00312 -2.397 -0.865* 
 (0.0934) (0.0147) (0.0303) (1.641) (0.480) 
      
Gender-Dummy -0.00254 -0.0106 -0.0317 1.175 -0.289 
 (0.0736) (0.0202) (0.0514) (1.113) (1.203) 
      
CapEx/Total Assets -0.258 0.168 -0.465* -22.31 -2.222 
 (0.412) (0.106) (0.243) (29.20) (6.170) 
      
Acquisitions/Total Assets -0.399 0.211** 0.348 -4.470 5.696 
 (0.614) (0.0991) (0.236) (3.653) (8.561) 
      
Intercept 0.327 -0.0193 -0.0342 6.108 2.707** 
 (0.295) (0.0372) (0.0844) (4.720) (1.233) 
 
Observations 416 416 416 138 329 




6.3.2 HIGH OWNERSHIP CEOS  
ACCOUNTING-BASED PERFORMANCE 
Analyzing the Tables 19, 20 and 21 below, I find no evidence of shared significant 
relationships between the industry-adjusted performance measures and the incentive-based 
compensation factors. The different regression models differ highly and seems to create 
somewhat random results. This is something that contradicts the findings of the high 
ownership sample. Looking individually at the different regression methodologies, we can 
see that the first model produces 1% and 5% level significance from option grants on ROE 
and ROA respectively. The latter relationship was also found in the low ownership sample. 
We see further that Bonus (%) seems to cause positive correlation to ROE and ROA 
additionally. A positive significant relationship between Stock Owned by CEO (%) and ROE 
is also found. The second OLS model in Table 20 provide no significant relationships among 
compensation factors and performance, indicating that there are few effects from providing 
incentive-based compensation on performance for the sample companies from year two and 
year three respectively. Observing the third OLS model, I see a negative significant 
correlation between New Stock Grants (%) and ROE. 
MARKET-BASED PERFORMANCE 
Focusing on the market-based measures, I find a shared positive and significant relationship 
between Bonus (%) and price-to-book when looking at the first and the third OLS models in 
Table 19 and 21. In the first model, we see a positive coefficient of 63.24 being significant at 
5% level. The third model yields a coefficient of 7.745 being significant at 5% level also. 
Both these models represent compensation factors from year one post-turnover for the sample 
CEOs, indicating that providing bonus to the new CEO in his or her first year of employment 
might provide positive short-term and long-term effects on the company Price-to-Book. 
Receiving bonus so early of their employment might indicate to the market that the manager 
and the firm is well governed, increasing the expectations from the market. The first and third 
model provide also positive coefficients of option grants on Price-to-Book, being significant 
in the first model. In a similar manner, it might cause the market to react positively with 























TABLE 19: OLS MODEL 1. LOW OWNERSHIP SAMPLE 
Heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors in parenthesis. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, 
*p<0.10. Dependent variables represent industry-adjusted performance measures from 
year two after turnover. Independent variables are lagged by one year. Missing numbers 
reflect too few observations.  
!
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 

























 (0.264) (0.0673) (0.0912) (.) (1.476) 
      
Option Grants (%) 1.534*** 0.206** -0.0431 -4.482 2.776* 
 (0.373) (0.0951) (0.130) (.) (1.576) 
      
Bonus (%) 1.651* 0.784*** 0.346 0 63.24** 
 (0.894) (0.228) (0.307) (.) (25.48) 
      
Stock Owned by CEO (%) 2.246** 0.116 0.362 0 -5.063 
 (1.002) (0.255) (0.344) (.) (4.745) 
      
Ln (Total Assets) 0.0479 0.0149 -0.00216 -0.249 0.259 
 (0.0463) (0.0118) (0.0167) (.) (0.229) 
      
R&D/Sales 1.557 0.308 0.547 0 6.806 
 (2.367) (0.603) (0.815) (.) (5.168) 
      
LT-Debt/Total Assets 1.100* -0.145 0.108 2.582 -0.189 
 (0.532) (0.136) (0.190) (.) (2.266) 
      
Departure-Dummy 0 0 0 0 -0.619 
 (.) (.) (.) (.) (1.954) 
      
Recruiting-Dummy 0.264 -0.0443 -0.553*** 0.0918 10.66* 
 (0.333) (0.0848) (0.170) (.) (6.062) 
      
Age-Dummy -0.273 -0.0576 0.0195 -2.113 0.797 
 (0.188) (0.0480) (0.0716) (.) (1.039) 
      
Gender-Dummy 0 0 0 0 -10.48 
 (.) (.) (.) (.) (6.372) 
      
CapEx/Total Assets 0.783 1.194** -0.715 0 7.097 
 (1.722) (0.439) (0.716) (.) (8.545) 
      
Acquisitions/Total Assets -1.171 0.158 -0.308 -3.618 1.727 
 (0.742) (0.189) (0.271) (.) (5.439) 
      
Intercept -1.166* -0.157 0.575** 1.929 -3.272 
 (0.591) (0.151) (0.269) (.) (2.006) 
 
Observations 30 30 29 8 29 






















TABLE 20: OLS MODEL 2. HIGH OWNERSHIP SAMPLE. 
Heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors in parenthesis. ***p<0.01, 
**p<0.05, *p<.010 Dependent variables represent industry-adjusted performance 
measures from year three post-turnover. Independent variables lagged by one 
year. Missing numbers reflect too few observations.  
Dependent Variables: Industry-Adjusted Performance Measures 
!
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 

























 (0.446) (0.0878) (0.149) (.) (3.575) 
      
Option Grants (%) 0.0613 -0.0854 -0.0624 0 -2.113 
 (0.526) (0.0967) (0.160) (.) (2.386) 
      
Bonus (%) 0.206 -0.0678 0.163 -5.174 -0.458 
 (0.721) (0.166) (0.312) (.) (3.742) 
      
Stock Owned by CEO (%) -1.923 -0.0146 0.0783 0 1.072 
 (1.771) (0.285) (0.472) (.) (8.097) 
      
Ln (Total Assets) 0.0311 -0.00255 0.0156 0.335 -0.0623 
 (0.0289) (0.00644) (0.0125) (.) (0.295) 
      
R&D/Sales -0.623 -0.154 -0.0272 0 5.815 
 (1.061) (0.193) (0.350) (.) (5.579) 
      
LT-Debt/Total Assets 0.117 -0.0592 -0.0426 -0.0400 -0.683 
 (0.345) (0.0725) (0.0966) (.) (2.701) 
      
Departure-Dummy -0.387 -0.0310 -0.0109 4.007 -0.191 
 (0.248) (0.0404) (0.0841) (.) (1.148) 
      
Recruiting-Dummy 0.380* 0.0715* 0.0748 4.016 0.976 
 (0.212) (0.0394) (0.0620) (.) (0.893) 
      
Age-Dummy 0.103 -0.0277 0.00707 -5.589 -0.00322 
 (0.226) (0.0279) (0.0402) (.) (0.792) 
      
Gender-Dummy -0.230 0.0361 -0.00877 0 3.526** 
 (0.292) (0.0473) (0.0907) (.) (1.660) 
      
Capex/Total Assets 1.379 0.718** 0.488 0 17.35 
 (1.163) (0.298) (0.456) (.) (16.80) 
      
Acquisitions/Total Assets -1.384 -0.256 -0.174 0 2.659 
 (2.918) (0.290) (0.489) (.) (4.198) 
      
Intercept -0.232 -0.0641 -0.172 -5.787 -3.705 
 (0.369) (0.0690) (0.126) (.) (2.280) 
 



















TABLE 21: OLS MODEL 3. HIGH OWNERSHIP SAMPLE. 
Heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors in parenthesis. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, 
*p<0.10. Dependent variables represent industry-adjusted performance measures 
from year three post-turnover. Independent variables lagged two years. Missing 
numbers reflect too few observations. 
!
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 


























 (0.456) (0.0905) (0.1000) (.) (1.450) 
      
Option Grants (%) -0.0334 0.0165 -0.00530 -3.979 1.276 
 (0.339) (0.0966) (0.0887) (.) (2.007) 
      
Bonus (%) -0.430 0.0449 0.534 0 7.745** 
 (0.742) (0.199) (0.320) (.) (3.800) 
      
Stock Owned by CEO (%) -2.434 0.214 0.123 0 17.00** 
 (1.934) (0.301) (0.322) (.) (7.025) 
      
Ln (Total Assets) 0.0690 -0.00701 0.0218 -0.142 -0.238 
 (0.0455) (0.0115) (0.0131) (.) (0.205) 
      
R&D/Sales -2.252 -0.112 0.327 0 7.703* 
 (1.520) (0.329) (0.423) (.) (4.401) 
      
LT-Debt/Total Assets -0.0580 -0.114 0.168* 6.219 1.425 
 (0.438) (0.133) (0.0988) (.) (2.159) 
      
Departure-Dummy -0.339 -0.0810 -0.0168 2.354 -0.610 
 (0.212) (0.0574) (0.0800) (.) (0.839) 
      
Recruiting-Dummy 0.340 -0.0540 -0.0533 -0.492 -0.311 
 (0.217) (0.0781) (0.0736) (.) (0.740) 
      
Age-Dummy -0.0152 0.0245 0.00109 0 0.799 
 (0.212) (0.0487) (0.0417) (.) (0.778) 
      
Gender-Dummy -0.666 0.0222 -0.00835 0 3.337*** 
 (0.457) (0.0806) (0.110) (.) (1.004) 
      
CapEx/Total Assets 0.853 0.581* 0.865 0 -8.036 
 (0.914) (0.305) (0.617) (.) (11.36) 
      
Acquisitions/Total Assets 0.232 -0.0451 -0.298 0 -10.15*** 
 (0.639) (0.146) (0.178) (.) (2.917) 
      
Intercept 0.290 0.0615 -0.145 -1.331 -2.196 
 (0.484) (0.164) (0.162) (.) (1.521) 
 
Observations 46 46 46 7 52 






By analyzing the developments surrounding CEO turnovers for the different performance 
measures in Section 6.1, I find mixed results. Looking at the accounting-based measures, I 
find that ROA and the EBITDA margin increase steadily for the turnovers finding place in 
2009. The industry-adjusted EBITDA for turnovers in 2010 and ROE in 2011 show the same 
results. The development in EBITDA margins from turnovers in 2012 show perfect inverse 
relationships between pre- and post-turnover, supporting the findings of Denis & Denis 
(1995), Coughlan & Schmidt (1985) and Warner et al. (1988). Except from these, I find large 
variations in the margins on a year to year basis, meaning that sustained relative improvement 
is not found. ROE is a measure that provide especially large fluctuations.  
Regarding the second hypothesis of the thesis, I find robust positive relationships between 
CEO Option Grants (%) on industry-adjusted ROA in all regression methodologies 
performed. Such a finding strengthens the plausibility that providing CEOs with an increased 
relative fraction of option grants early after employment, can cause increased return on the 
companies’ assets the following financial year. I find also a robust positive relationship 
between New Stock Grants (%) and price-to-book for the sample companies for all regression 
methodologies performed. In this way, holding all other variables constant, an increase in the 
fraction of new stock grants to total compensation early after employment for the CEOs, 
seems to provide increases in company price-to-book the following year of measurement. 
New Stock Grants (%) provide also positive effects on ROA for all regression methodologies. 
The compensation element is however not significant with regards to this relationship. 
After splitting the sample CEOs in the last hypothesis of the thesis into low ownership and 
high ownership, we are presented with other interesting findings. I find that the low 
ownership CEOs provide robust negative relationships between existing stock ownership and 
industry-adjusted ROA. I find too that increasing the fraction of option grants in the CEO 
compensation packages seems to cause positive effects on industry-adjusted ROA. The 
positive repeating relationship between New Stock Grants (%) and the EBITDA margin is 
something that supports the third hypothesis, indicating motivational effects of receiving new 
equity by the low ownership CEOs. Apart from this, I find no sound evidence that low 
ownership CEOs are influenced more by being provided with new equity grants compared to 




8 ASSESSMENT OF ROBUSTNESS  
 
An important aspect when working with econometric analyses is to assess the robustness of 
results achieved. The following section addresses potential aspects that might affect the 
results that the analyses has produced, and how these are accounted for. 
First of all, using only one or two performance measures could have given results of the 
analyses that might not have been reliable in a bigger setting. In order to get as robust 
interpretations of the results as possible, I have included two different market-based 
performance measures and three different accounting-based measures in order to get as 
plausible results as possible. Interpreting results by only using one regression method might 
similarly be insufficient in analyses on effects regarding performance measures. Making a 
comparison of four different regressions, utilizing three different methodologies have 
provided sharpness to the relevant results achieved. 
One of the most important factors to avoid in regression analyses is the presence of 
multicollinearity.21 The choices of independent variables related to the regression analyses 
conducted in answering hypothesis two and three of the thesis, have been made after 
thorough analysis of past research and econometric principles. Firstly, there has been a 
thorough research on what kinds of variables that collectively explains firm performance in 
the best manner, without causing multicollinearity. In this way, I have conducted Variance 
Inflation Factor (VIF) tests on the different independent variables in order to be fully sure 
that no multicollinearity exists. The results of the VIF test signaled no multicollinearity 
between independent variables for the tests conducted in this thesis, and can be found in 
Appendix Part A.1.2. Another important aspect in conducting econometric regressions is to 
avoid the existence of heteroscedasticity in the model.22 This problem has effectively been 
avoided in the regression analyses of the thesis by using the robust-function in Stata. The 
Robust Standard Errors effectively make sure that residuals with large values are being 
down-weighted in the regression, such that heteroscedasticity does not occur.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 	  Multicollinearity refers to correlation between the independent variables in a regression analysis. See 
Appendix Part A.1.2 for more information	  
22	  Heteroscedasticity refers to the case where the error U does not have the same variance given values of 




A common problem among research on firm performance is the presence of endogeneity.23 
Endogeneity can be caused by different factors, such as omitting variables, making functional 
form misspecifications, making measurement errors or having simultaneity of variables 
(Woolridge, 2006). In order to avoid endogeneity in the best possible manner, most of the 
independent variables in the thesis relies on past research. I have additionally added extra 
explanatory variables such as acquisitions, capital expenditures and different dummies in 
order to make sure that the concept of omitting variables is minimized in all the relevant 
regressions. I have further conducted Hausman tests for endogeneity on the different random 
effects models. The results of the test comparing random effects and fixed effects model can 
be found under Appendix Part A.1.3 below. All tests indicate no form of endogeneity for the 
relevant regressions. The results also indicate that the ransom effects model is more efficient 
than the fixed effects model, and thus might be more reliable. 
9 ADVICE FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
	  
Even though literature contains a lot of research on CEO turnovers, there are a lot of new 
exciting areas that could be further exploited. A possible new research could for instance be a 
comparison of different time periods and economic states. One could construct a similar 
dataset for five years prior the outburst of the financial crisis, and compare to the one utilized 
in this paper. In this way, one could possibly see the differences in compensation and firm 
decision effects in booms versus recessions. The findings of such a study could possibly 
strengthen knowledge for company executives on the timing of new CEO appointments, and 
how to best construct initial CEO compensation packages. It could also give some answers to 
what kinds of decisions with regards to firm investments that a newly hired CEO should 
undertake in his or her first year in the position.  
Another possible research could use a dataset spanning a longer time period, comparing 
CEOs with different tenure in the forced category. In this way, one might get some answers 
to questions regarding the correctness of letting a CEO go early. There are a lot of incidents 
in where companies might be too impatient with their CEOs, and where they would actually 
benefit from more continuity. Such a study could measure the effects of changing CEOs at a 
high ratio, compared to staying with only one for a longer time period. A lot of sports teams 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23	  Endogeneity refers to the case where an explanatory variable X is correlated with the error term U.	   See 




are for instance criticized for letting their manager go early, without even giving the person 
time to make a real impact on the team. This could be an interesting market to study further.  
A study utilizing a longer time-series, would also have the possibility to utilize lags of even 
more years. My study seeks to capture effects of one year effects. A study looking at a large 
time-series could possibly look at a sample with CEOs of longer tenure and measure effects 
of compensation and firm decision with lags of up to two and three years for instance. This 
might be interesting as some firm decisions and compensation effects takes longer time to 
implement and mature. A longer time series might also provide a bigger data sample, which 
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A1: STATISTICAL ROBUSTNESS TESTS 
A1.1 CONTROLLING FOR HETEROSCEDASTICITY USING ROBUST OLS 
Heteroscedasticity in regression analyses refers to the violation of the assumption that the 
error term U has the same variance give any value of the relevant explanatory variables in the 
regression (Woolridge, 2006). The assumption states that VAR(U|X) = s^2 for all 
explanatory variables included. The consequences of having heteroscedasticity in the 
regression is that the variance formulas of the estimators are invalid. Therefore, statistical 
inference might be affected. The use of robust command in the OLS regressions effectively 
adjusts for any heteroscedasticity that may appear in the regressions, and is therefore utilized 
in the relevant analyses using OLS. This provides Stata to produce robust standard errors, t-
tests and 95% confidence variables.  
 
A1.2 TESTING FOR MULTICOLLINEARITY USING VIF-TESTS AND PEARSONS R 
Multicollinearity refers to the existence of correlation between independent variables in a 
regression analysis (Woolridge, 2006). One of the fundamental assumptions in econometrics 
is that explanatory variables are independent of each other. If a relationship exists between 
any of these variables, the regression will be biased and might cause the coefficient estimates 
of the regression to change erratically. A way to test for multicollinearity in a multiple 
regression model, is to conduct VIF tests. The VIF tests give each explanatory variable a 
score explaining the degree of how much the variance of an estimated regression coefficient 
has increased as a result of multicollinearity. A rule of thumb states that a VIF value higher 
than 10 indicates the existence of multicollinearity (O'Brien, 2007). The results of a sample 
of VIF tests conducted on the independent variables of the first four OLS regressions model 
in the thesis are provided in Figure 13,14,15 and 16 on the next page. We can see from the 
figures that the VIF scores centres around 1, which indicates no multicollinearity. The test is 












FIGURE 13: OUTPUT FROM VIF TEST NUMBER 1 FIGURE 14: OUTPUT FROM VIF TEST NUMBER 2 
FIGURE 15: OUTPUT FROM VIF TEST NUMBER 4 




A Pearson’s R test for multicollinearity has been further assessed in order to check for 
multicollinearity between the different variables of the analyses. The Pearson’s R provide 
values from -1 to 1, where -1 means perfect negative linear relationship and 1 represents 
perfect positive linear relationship. A value of zero indicates no relationships between the 
variables. We can see from the sample output of the test below that there are no values close 
to or equal -1 or 1. Again, this indicates no multicollinearity. It should however be noted that 
the Pearson’s R relies on four assumptions in order to provide robust interpretations. The 
assumptions can be stated as follows: (1) The variables should be continuously measured, (2) 
There needs to be a linear relationship between the two variables, (3) There should be no 
significant outliers and (4) the variables should be approximately normally distributed. The 
regression analyses of this thesis utilize some time-invariant variables such as the Gender-
Dummy and Recruiting-Dummy, which might affect the results of the robustness test as these 









A1.3 TESTING FOR ENDOGENEITY IN RANDOM EFFECTS MODEL USING HAUSMAN’S TEST 
Using any regression model, it is important to be aware of the possibility of having 
endogeneity problems. Endogeneity means in this setting that there is correlation between 
one or more of the explanatory variables of the model and the error term U. Such a presence 
would possibly cause biased and inconsistent estimators of the parameters obtained from the 
regressions. A Hausman test effectively test for such endogeneity problems in the random 
effects model. Testing for this endogeneity in this manner is also an indirect test of random 
effects model versus fixed effects model. The test specifically tests the coefficient estimates 
from the random effects model, from those of the fixed effects model. The idea is that both 
the random effects and fixed effects estimators should be consistent, given that there is no 
correlation between the error term and the explanatory variables. In the case where the 
estimators are consistent, one should expect the convergence to the true parameter bi for large 
samples. The random effects model is initially seen as a more efficient compared to the fixed 
effects model, and is in many cases preferred if the null hypothesis from the Hausman’s test 
is not rejected. Below are the results of the different Hausman’s tests under the following 
null-hypotheses:  
H0 = There are no endogeneity problems in the random effects model 
Implying also that: 
H0 = Difference in coefficients are not systematic 
From the regression outputs below, we can see that the Hausman’s test obtain chi-squared 
value of 6.82 and a complementary p-value of 0.7424. Based on these results, we cannot 
reject the null hypothesis, even at 10% level, and conclude that the random effects model 
does not provide endogenous relationships. A similar test is conducted for all different 
variants of regressions and provides the same conclusion. This means additionally that the 
random effects model, should be preferred to the fixed effects model. I performed the 
Hausman’s test in Stata by first regressing the random effects model, and then the fixed 





















A2: SUMMARY OF REGRESSION VARIABLES AND THEIR SOURCES 
  
Variable Description Source
IA TOTAL Q Ratio of the individual companies' market value of assets Financial Ratios Suite by WRDS
divided by book value of assets. Adjusted by subtracting
the corresponding industry median ratio.
IA ROA Ratio of the individual companies' EBITDA divided by Execucomp, Financial Ratios Suite by WRDS
their total assets. Adjusted by subtracting the corresp-
onding industry median ratio
IA ROE Ratio of the individual companies' EBITDA divided by Execucomp Financial Ratios Suite by WRDS
their total equity. Adjusted by subtracting the corresp-
onding industry median ratio.
IA EBITDA Margin Ratio of the individual companies' EBITDA divided by Execucomp, Financial Ratios Suite by WRDS
their total sales. Adjusted subtracting the corresponding 
industry median ratio.
IA Price-To-Book Ratio of the individual compenies' market value of equity Financial Ratios Suite by WRDS
divided by book value of equity. Adjusted by subtracting
the corresponding industry median ratio.
New Equity Grants (%) The proportion of new stock grants as a percentage of total WRDS, Execucomp
compensation for the individual incoming CEO's. Calculated
by finding the positive year-on-year changes in total equity 
values received by the CEO's. 
Option Grants (%) The proportion of option grants as a percentage of total WRDS, Execucomp
compensation on a year-to year basis for the individual 
incoming CEO's
Bonus (%) The proportion of bonus as a percentage of total compen- WRDS, Execucomp
sation received on a year-to year basis for the indicidual
CEO's
Stock Owned by CEO (%) The total stockholdings of CEO in the company entered WRDS, Compustat
Ln (Total Assets) Natural Logarithm of firm Total Assets measured on a WRDS, Compustat
year to year basis
R&D / Sales Research & Development expenses divided by total sales. WRDS, Compustat
Measured on a year-to-year basis
LT-Debt/Total Assets Long term debt divided by total assets. Measured on a year- WRDS, Compustat
to-year basis
Departure Dummy Provided value 1 if forced, 0 otherwise Jenter & Kanaan (2014)
Recruiting Dummy Internal hires are provided with 1 if CEO had a position WRDS, Execucomp
in the company before the position as CEO. 0 otherwise.
Age-Dummy Calculated by subtracting (2017-Start Year of CEO) WRDS, Execucomp
from%Current'Age.%
Gender-Dummy Provided value 1 if male and 0 if female WRDS, Execucomp
CapEx/Total Assets Calculated by dividing CapEx to total assets of the firm. WRDS, Compustat
Acquisitions/Total Assets Calculated by dividing Acquisition to total asset of the firm WRDS, Compustat




A3 A CLOSER LOOK AT THE FAMA 48 INDUSTRIES 
 
Figure 19 below provide a full overview over the 48 different industry categories as defined 
by Fama. The numbers in the parentheses indicate the amount of different services that the 
industry category covers. As we saw in Figure 1 of the thesis, business services accounts for 
the highest number of turnovers. We can additionally see that this is one of the widest defined 
industries from the table below, spanning a total of 44 different services. Examples of such 
services are management consulting, advertising, security and cleaning. The retail category 
spans 64 different services being the largest defined category, and the one experiencing 
second highest number of turnovers. Examples of retail services as defined by Fama are 
hardware stores, convenience stores, bakeries and book stores. Banking and financials cover 
25 services, thereby depository institutions, commercial banks, savings institutions and 
federal credit agencies. A full overview of all Fama services connected to the defined 
industries can be downloaded from the Internet for the interested reader.   
 
FIGURE 19: OVEVIEW OF FAMA FRENCH SECTORS 
